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Founding Fathers by Dr Lee Kam Hing
First Finance Minister: Lee having a discussion with Tun Tan Siew Sin, the man who would take over from him as Finance Minister in 1959.
Despite initial opposition both within Umno and MCA, Tun H.S.
Lee was one of the key leaders who persuaded the two communal parties to create
a coalition that has since governed the country.
TUN Lee Hau Sik is generally credited with initiating in 1952 an UMNO–MCA
electoral alliance that marked the start of an enduring inter–ethnic coalition,
a partnership which soon included the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) and which
led Malaya to independence.
Lee’s other major role was in helping to set up the Malayan Chinese Association
in 1949. Lee later represented the MCA in constitutional talks, and was the only
Chinese signatory to the independence agreement concluded in London in 1956.
The 1952 electoral alliance signed by Lee and Datuk Yahya Razak of Umno to
contest the KL elections was one in a remarkable sequence of events that
persuaded two communal parties to set aside their wariness of each other to
create a coalition that has since governed the country.
There was initial opposition both within Umno and in the MCA leadership to the
move. Some in the MCA leadership favoured working with the non–racial
Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) of Datuk Onn Jaafar. But it was Lee who
argued strongly for partnership with Umno on a basis of parity.
With independence in 1957, Tunku Abdul Rahman appointed Lee as Malaya’s first
Finance Minister. On his retirement in 1959, Lee started the Development and
Commercial Bank which in 1984 became Malaysia’s fifth largest bank. Two of his
sons went into politics.
Datuk Douglas Lee contested successfully the 1952 KL elections and Datuk Alex
Lee was briefly in MCA and later a deputy minister representing Gerakan.
Background of Lee
Lee was the only major leader of the independence movement not born in Malaya.
Unlike most immigrants, Lee came from a wealthy family in Zhenlong, Gaozhou,
south China. The family business of Kum Lun Tai was in silk trade, remittance,
and mining, and had offices in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Lee studied at Queen’s College in Hong Kong and completed Law and Economics at
Cambridge University. He then worked briefly in Hainan and with the P&O Bank in
Hong Kong.
In 1924 he came to Kuala Lumpur on family business. The family had acquired some
tin mines. Soon after his arrival Lee bought more mines, this time for himself,
and stayed on.
Lee adapted quickly to Malaya and was active in the guilds and clan
associations. He helped form the Kwantung (Guangdong) Association, Chinese
Mining Association, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. When Japan invaded
China in 1937, Lee headed the Selangor China Relief Fund in support of China.
Lee was known for his association with China’s Kuomintang Party.
In 1941, when war broke out in Malaya, Lee and his family evacuated to India. He
met Chiang Kai–shek, China’s President, in Congqing, China. Knowing of his
Cambridge background and close association with the British, Chiang appointed
him a colonel and, in that capacity, Lee liaised between the British and Chinese
armies along the China–Burma border.
Setting up MCA
After World War II, Lee was appointed to committees entrusted with rebuilding
the Malayan economy.
And before long, he was helping to set up the MCA.
Already, in 1943 Tun Tan Cheng Lock had talked about the need for a Malayan
Chinese organisation. The MCA was formed at what were probably the most
troubling times for the Chinese. The community was still recovering from the
difficult and at times dangerous years of the Japanese Occupation.
Now in 1948 they were caught between an armed rebellion that was communist–led
and a colonial regime seen increasingly as pro–Malay. Nearly half a million
people, mostly Chinese, were being resettled in the New Villages. Many Chinese
saw an urgent need, therefore, to have a party to rally the community and to
represent them in constitutional discussions that were expected.
In the meanwhile Sir Henry Gurney, High Commissioner of Malaya, was anxious that
there should be a party to represent the Chinese in the coming political
transition.
More importantly, the British wanted anti–communist Chinese to help fight the
MCP–led insurrection. Among such leaders was Lee, strongly anti–communist who in
1946 had started the China Press to counter the pro–left People’s Voice which
was then the only local Chinese newspaper.
In December 1948, Gurney saw Lee who then arranged for the High Commissioner to
meet 16 Chinese members of the Federal Legislative Council. Gurney assured the
Chinese legislators that the British supported the forming of a Chinese
organisation.
For several weeks then, Chinese guilds and associations all over the country
held gatherings to select delegates to the inaugural meeting. Lee was elected to
lead the Selangor delegation. At a gathering on Feb 27, 1949 the MCA was formed
and Tan Cheng Lock was elected president. In the subsequent months, the party
was preoccupied with welfare work in the New Villages where a third of the
Chinese population had been resettled.
The 1952 KL Elections
Local elections were held for the first time in 1951 as a preparation towards
eventual self–government in Malaya. The KL elections on Feb 16 1952 drew most
attention not only because it was the capital but also because the IMP was
contesting and expecting to make a major impact.
The IMP appeared formidable, having on its side Datuk Onn Jaafar, former
founder–leader of Umno, and Tan Cheng Lock, founder–leader of the MCA.
Several Umno and senior MCA leaders including Tan Siew Sin, Khoo Teik Ee and
Yong Shook Lin were with IMP, and it was also backed by the MIC.
Umno and MCA decided to contest. This was MCA’s first experience in elections
while for Umno its Penang performance where it won only one seat had not been
inspiring.
Lee, head of Selangor MCA and Datuk Yahya Razak, chairman of Umno KL elections
committee, reached an electoral pact to have a single slate of candidates. For
although KL had a large Chinese population, MCA’s manifesto declared that “the
interests of the members of the other communities should also be represented”.
For Umno, Chinese support was needed to defeat the IMP, its main rival.
Essentially a local initiative, the electoral pact drew strong criticisms not
only from IMP but also from MCA and Umno. Yahya Razak’s own division head Datin
Putih Mariah resigned on Feb 10, just days before elections in protest at the
pact.
Two senior MCA leaders, Tan Siew Sin and Khoo Teik Ee, the party’s honorary
treasurer, declared that MCA’s central working committee had not approved the
Umno–MCA merger and in their campaigning for IMP singled out Lee for attacks.
In the end the Umno–MCA alliance defeated the IMP by winning nine of the 12
seats. The results were a major boost to the new alliance and marked the
beginning of IMP’s end.
Expanding the alliance
Lee favoured expanding the Umno–MCA alliance. In the weeks after the KL
elections, Lee was in contact with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president of Umno.
The Tunku was the first to congratulate Lee on the KL results. On Feb 22, Lee
informed Tan Cheng Lock that the Tunku was agreeable to enlarging the alliance.
Meanwhile, Lee was worried at the continued association of Tan with the IMP. On
March 3, 1952 he informed Tan that senior and influential MCA state leaders had
expressed deep concern at Tan’s calling of an inaugural Malacca IMP meeting and
feared that he might be made state IMP chairman while still a leader of the MCA.
Lee wrote: “They feel that if you accept the presidency of the IMP in Malacca,
it might not be conducive for frank discussions with the Umno in the future”
Tan, on his part, continued to be cautious about an Umno–MCA alliance. He
believed that several important issues had to be resolved before agreeing to
Sino–Malay collaboration.
He wanted to know whether the Tunku accepted the jus soli principle for
citizenship and a Malaya for Malayans. Writing to Lee on Feb 29, Tan explained
that “there must be communal equality in the Federation involving equality of
opportunity and treatment and in shouldering the duties and in sharing the
rights of Malayan citizenship among all the domiciled communities making up the
population of Malaya.”
Tan and other mainly Western–educated MCA leaders embraced Datuk Onn’s
non–racial IMP and saw it as moderate in approach compared to Umno.
In particular, Tan remembered Datuk Onn’s willingness to stake his position as
Umno president by insisting on liberalising citizenship requirements and opening
Umno to non–Malays.
They were, on the other hand, unsure of Tunku who took over Umno in August 1951.
Unwilling to abandon Datuk Onn and the IMP, Tan proposed giving MCA branches the
right to work either with IMP or Umno. Speaking to the press on Feb 18, 1952,
Tan declared: “I support the principle of IMP–MCA–Umno cooperation”.
To Lee on Feb 22, he explained, “You are materially aware that influential
members of the MCA want cooperation with IMP. So probably the MCA is divided on
this question”.
Umno, which regarded IMP as its main rival, would certainly not have accepted
Tan’s proposition. And neither did Lee and the more politically conservative
Chinese.
Writing to Tan on March 1, 1952 Lee revealed that the Tunku indicated to him
privately that he accepted the jus soli principle although there was a minority
within Umno strongly opposed to such a concession.
It might have been, as some writers had suggested, that Lee preferred an Umno–MCA
alliance because he and Datuk Onn were not on good terms. But in fact
correspondence at the end of 1951 showed that there was cordiality between the
two leaders and even after IMP’s inaugural meeting, Datuk Onn again invited Lee
to join IMP.
Lee’s stand was more likely influenced by his identification with groups in the
MCA who were worried about the future of Chinese education, language, and
citizenship.
These groups believed that the Chinese were politically weak and divided, and a
distinctly Chinese party was therefore needed to safeguard the community’s
interest especially at a time when British policies were interpreted as
anti–Chinese.
They therefore believed that MCA’s future could best be pursued by retaining its
identity, and therefore an alliance with another communal party like Umno was a
more workable option.
Lee also learnt that Datuk Onn was a signatory to the Majority Report on the
Immigration Ordinance of 1950 which he deemed unfavourable to the Chinese.
On March 5, Lee alerted Tan to the report, soon to be presented to the
Legislative Council, and he questioned the sincerity of Datuk Onn’s multi–racial
claims.
Eventually, Tunku and Tan Cheng Lock met on 18 March and Lee joined them for
dinner discussions. After several more rounds of talks involving other leaders,
a nation–wide Umno–MCA alliance was institutionalised.
The electoral alliance in 1952 was an important start to meeting British
insistence that there must be inter–ethnic cooperation before discussion of
independence.
But more importantly, when independence talks were held leaders of this new
political alliance were ready to agree to major compromises over contentious
matters so as to achieve a united front.
Thus Lee together with Datuk Yahya Razak, started what later came to assume a
political mystique – an inter–ethnic coalition that won independence for Malaya
and created Malaysia.
The Founding Fathers series is coordinated by Dr Joseph Fernando of
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and Research Editor Dr Lee Kam Hing
(leekh@thestar.com.my).
Defeated but Lee still the coalition’s manager
FOLLOWING the 1952 KL elections Gerald Templer the High Commissioner, appointed
Tun H.S. Lee as Member for Railways and Ports in the Legislative Council while
Dr Ismail Datuk Abdul Rahman was made member for Lands, Mines and
Communications.
In 1955 Lee lost the Selangor MCA leadership to Ong Yoke Lin. In 1957 an attempt
by Lee and his son Douglas to regain control of Selangor MCA was unsuccessful.
Lee’s aloof style was said to have contributed to his Selangor MCA defeats.
Despite these reverses Lee was entrusted with managing the Alliance campaign in
the 1955 elections.
And Lee represented the MCA in the London talks and later in MCA and Alliance
constitutional discussions. At this time, there were very few in the MCA with
Lee’s educational and technocratic background as well as influence within the
Chinese community and with the British administration.
Upon independence, Lee was appointed the country’s first Finance Minister and
the Tunku relied on him to negotiate financing for the country’s early
development.
Leaders of British business groups were comfortable with Lee. One of them was
H.B. Hussey, the president of the FMS Chamber of Commerce, who declared that he
had “every confidence in the business acumen of our Minister of Finance”.
Yet Lee could be firm. When British financial institutions in Malaya gave little
support to Malaya’s industrialisation programme, Lee issued a veiled threat:
“Unless the Government (of Tunku) freely received from private enterprise
already established ? the support and cooperation necessary for the maintenance
of the Government’s (laissez–faire) policy, the Government might have to
revise its policy and the change might not be equally advantageous”.