JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS: WHO HAS THE LAST SAY

RAJA AZIZ ADDRUSE*

The Judiciary

When Malaya (as it then was) attained its independence in 1957, it inherited from the British a judiciary that was highly respected. It continued to enjoy that reputation even after it was Malayanised and after Malaysia was formed in 1963.

The judiciary became known to many parts of the world after this country hosted the Commonwealth Magistrates Conference in 1976. That Conference and other international law conferences which our judges frequently attended helped to foster close ties between Malaysian judges and judges from many parts of the world. Through their participation in these conferences and the knowledge gained from exchanging ideas with their foreign counterparts, Malaysian judges kept abreast of the latest development in the law.

Though generally regarded as conservative the judiciary had a reputation for independence and impartiality. Judges were looked up to as persons who were fair and just. The public held them in high esteem. There was never any accusation or suggestion made that any of them was corrupt or in any way dishonest, or had been improperly influenced in giving a decision. As with any other judiciary, judges made errors in their judgments; but judgments were carefully scrutinised on appeal to the Federal Court (then the intermediate appellate court). A party who still felt aggrieved could, subject to leave (if required) being obtained, appeal further to the Privy Council which was the final appellate tribunal. But such was the care taken by the Federal Court in dealing with the appeals that came before it that fewer and fewer litigants were appealing against its decisions to the Privy Council. When the yearly number

* Advocate & Solicitor, High Court of Malaya.

consistently became so few, it was decided to discontinue appeals to the Privy Council. This was done in stages – at first in respect of criminal matters, a while later, in respect of constitutional law matters[1], and, finally, in respect of all other matters. With the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, the Federal Court became the final court of appeal and was renamed as the Supreme Court[2].

The events of 1988

The reputation of the judiciary, built up over the years, was severely tarnished by the events of 1988.

In May that year, the Prime Minister made representations to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that the then Lord President, Tun Mohd Salleh Abas, had committed various acts of judicial misbehaviour, thereby invoking the procedure provided under Art 125 of the Federal Constitution[3]. The charges leveled against Tun Salleh were generally regarded as politically motivated and tenuous. For some months prior to making the representations, the Prime Minister had, by his statements made in and outside Parliament, heavily criticised the judiciary and judges for various reasons. He was particularly incensed that the judiciary was construing laws in a manner not acceptable to him. By way of an example, he had, the year before, in moving a Bill to amend the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, condemned the judiciary in very strong terms, saying *that the amendments became more important because of* ***the inclination of certain sectors to use unwritten laws to obstruct the functions of the Government****; that* ***there were interested parties*** *who said that the purpose of any law made by Parliament had nothing whatsoever to do with the enforcement of the law; that the Act was being amended because the Government which*

[1] Courts of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act A328), w.e.f. 1 August 1978.
[2] Constitution (Amendment) Act 1983 (Act A566), w.e.f. 13 May 1983.
[3] Art 125(3) 'If the Prime Minister …represents to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that a judge of the Federal Court ought to be removed on the ground of misbehaviour….. the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall appoint a tribunal … and refer the representation to it; and may on the recommendation of the tribunal remove the judge from office.'

represented the people was of the opinion that ***it was dangerous for the administration of the nation that the laws be interpreted according to the discretion of two or three people****.*

As required by Art 125, a tribunal to investigate the alleged misbehaviour was appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The composition of the tribunal left grave doubts as to its independence and impartiality. The members were Tun Hamid Omar, then the Chief Justice of Malaya (as chairman); the then Chief Justice of Borneo; a judge who had retired some years earlier and who had been on the Federal Court Bench for just about one year; the Speaker of the Dewan Rakyat; the then Chief Justice of Sri Lanka and a serving judge from Singapore. The first two members mentioned were serving judges. Why the third member mentioned (the retired judge) was appointed in preference to retired Lords President of the Federal Court and other retired judges who had been on the Federal Court Bench for much longer periods, was a question the answer to which seemed obvious. Why the Speaker of the Dewan Rakyat, who was a politician, was appointed to be a member of a tribunal to investigate into alleged misconduct of the senior-most member of the Malaysian judiciary was another interesting question.

Then there was the question of the appointment of Tun Hamid as a member and as chairman of the tribunal. The Bar Council considered it to be highly improper. He clearly had a personal interest in the outcome of the tribunal's investigation because he stood to succeed Tun Salleh if he was dismissed by the tribunal. But Tun Hamid refused the Council's request that he resigned the appointment. He gave as his reason that he was obliged to obey the command of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and was under a duty to accept the appointment[4].

His subsequent involvement in the suspension of the five judges of the Supreme Court, who had granted Tun Salleh an interim order to restrain the tribunal from submitting its report to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, cast further

[4] 'I accepted my position in the tribunal because I was appointed under the Constitution. It was in fact a command by the King …. no subject will dare disobey the [the King]' – per Tun Hamid Omar in an interview published in Judicial Misconduct by Peter Aldridge Williams QC [1990], at p 216.

doubt on his ability to be impartial and fair in the investigation into Tun Salleh's alleged misbehaviour: the interim order had to be applied for in the face of the inordinate delay on the part of a judge of the High Court to come to a decision on Tun Salleh's application for leave to apply for an order of prohibition against the tribunal and its members. Although a party to the proceedings in the High Court and the Supreme Court, Tun Hamid insisted that he, and not the next most senior judge of the Supreme Court, had the right to empanel the judges of the Supreme Court to hear the application. What Tun Hamid was insisting on seemed to most lawyers to be at odds with established principles: he was seeking to be a judge in his own cause. But that did not seem to concern him.

Be that as it may, the five judges were suspended from office following his representations to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that the five judges had convened an illegal sitting of the Supreme Court[5]. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong constituted another tribunal under Art 125 to investigate into the alleged misbehaviour of the five judges. The composition of the second tribunal, too, left much to be desired. As with the first tribunal, the retired Lord Presidents and retired Federal Court judges who could have been appointed, were not chosen. The Malaysian judges chosen (there were four out of the six members of the tribunal appointed), were comparatively junior judges. The most senior of the four voluntarily recused himself from the tribunal for possible bias on objection taken by the suspended judges. Looking at the way the Malaysian members of the tribunal were chosen, the independence and impartiality of the second tribunal was also suspect.

Those who followed the events of 1988 closely, or were in some way involved in the defence of Tun Salleh or the five judges, had a good idea of what was to befall the judiciary in the years to come. Tun Hamid's open disregard of principles designed to ensure fairplay and fairness and the way Tun Salleh and the five judges were dealt with was bound to erode confidence in the judiciary and in those Malaysian members of the tribunals who were serving judges.

[5] Federal Constitution, Art 125(5).

Almost immediately after the five Supreme Court judges were suspended, the Malaysian Bar passed a resolution calling for Tun Hamid's removal from being a judge or for him not to be appointed the next Lord President of the Supreme Court in the event of Tun Salleh's dismissal. The stand taken by the Bar was later proved justified when the report of the Tun Salleh tribunal showed how it had failed to observe acceptable standards of proof in conducting its investigation. Its report was widely condemned. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, an organisation based in New York which sent its representatives to Malaysia on a fact-finding mission into the events of 1988, said:

> 'The Tribunal admitted that its recommendation might have been different had Salleh agreed to appear, an alarming admission given the severity of the charges and the Tribunal's purported role as a fact-finding, not a prosecutorial, body.'[6]

Writing in the London Observer, Geoffrey Robertson, QC, said:

> 'In a matter of such gravity, to acknowledge that the man found guilty of misbehaviour may well be innocent is an approach which exhibits a deplorable disregard for proper legal standards of proof.'[7]

Tun Salleh was dismissed from office. So were two of the five suspended judges.

The Judiciary after 1988

As was expected, the vacancy created by the dismissal of Tun Salleh was filled by Tun Hamid. With his appointment, the judiciary was seen no longer to be independent. Respected judges who had expressed their concern over the action taken against Tun Salleh were either transferred out of Kuala Lumpur or were sidelined. Seniority and merit were no longer the essential factors to be taken

[6] *Malaysia: Assault on the Judiciary* by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
[7] *The Observer*, 28 August 1988.

into account for promoting High Court judges to the Supreme Court. Many judges were promoted over others who were more senior to them, and more deserving.

While appointments from the Judicial and Legal Service were still based on seniority and merit, those from the Bar were selected by the new Lord President in exercise of his absolute discretion. Stung by the resolution passed by the Bar censuring him, the Lord President no longer consulted the chairman of the Bar Council or other senior members of the Bar on the suitability of candidates he proposed to recommend for appointment. To overcome the stricter standards which members of the Bar had to meet for appointment to the High Court Bench, the Federal Constitution was amended in 1994 to allow for the appointment of judicial commissioners 'with power to perform such functions of a judge of the High Court as appear to him to require to be performed ...'[8]. Normally appointed on contract for an initial term of two years, a judicial commissioner would thereafter be recommended for appointment as a judge of the High Court if found to have served satisfactorily. The recommendation to the Prime Minister would be made by the Lord President; and it was he who had to be satisfied.

No one knows what the criteria adopted are. Given that he is a judge 'on trial' during his 'probation' period, and without any security of tenure, the ability of a judicial commissioner to be independent and not to be influenced by personal consideration in making judicial decisions, is questionable. Most of the judges who were appointed after 1994 (after the amendment to the Constitution) came to the High Court Bench through this indirect route.

But the deterioration in the judiciary had been noticed much earlier. Soon after being appointed, the new Lord President set dates for the Supreme Court to hear cases which were regarded as 'sensitive' politically. The coram would comprise himself and two or four other judges who were aligned to him. The three suspended judges of the Supreme Court who had been exonerated by the second tribunal and who were more senior and had greater experience as Supreme

[8] Federal Constitution, Art 122AB, in force from 24 June 1994.

Court judges were left out. The outcome of those cases was predictable. In a highly political matter, the minority judgment of the Supreme Court of India was adopted to justify the court's decision when the judgments of the Indian judges who made up the majority were better-reasoned[9].

Beginning with only cases involving a political element, the courts' lack of impartiality was seen to gradually infect other cases as well. Certain parties seemed invariably to get their way in the courts. Rumours of certain judges having close associations with litigants began to surface.

The already tarnished image of the judiciary became worse after Tun Eusoff Chin succeeded Tun Hamid as Chief Justice of Malaysia[10], upon the latter's retirement. Unsuited for the post, Tun Eusoff gave full reign to his favourite judges to do as they liked. During his leadership, plaintiffs in defamation cases were allowed to specify the amount of damages they expected to get – in one case totaling to more than one hundred million Malaysian Ringgit. Judges did not seem to consider this new practice repugnant to the right to free speech and press freedom. Having plaintiffs state the amounts they claimed would, so it was held, enable defendants to know the limit of their liability, a somewhat shocking legal proposition even to a layman. This practice had a knock-on effect: it became the fashion of the time for any claim for damages (not necessarily for defamation) to specify 'mega' amounts. In a few claims for defamation, damages of one million Malaysian Ringgit were actually awarded, based purely on the judge's subjective view that the plaintiffs had been put to 'odium, ridicule and contempt', as if reciting that phrase, without more, justified the exorbitant awards. When it became so obvious that things had got out of control, the minister of government in charge of law felt compelled to speak out publicly against the award of these 'mega' sums. But that did little to improve the situation, due to his having somewhat resiled from the stand he had taken, which was apparent from his later conciliatory statements.

---

[9] *Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan v Nordin bin Salleh* [1992] 1 MLJ 697, SC.

[10] The new title given to the post of the Lord President after the establishment of the Court of Appeal in 1994. The Court of Appeal is an intermediate appellate court to which appeals from the High Court are first directed.

Some of the judges of the High Court became a law unto themselves. Lawyers appearing in court ran a real risk of being committed for contempt for the slightest perceived disrespect. The chairman of the Bar Council at the time was warned in open court that he would be committed for contempt of court if counsel appearing for the Council did not withdraw an authority which had been cited in support of an application made to the judge to recuse himself from hearing a matter: the matter concerned a proposed extraordinary general meeting of the Malaysian Bar to discuss the improper conduct of the Chief Justice, Tun Eusoff, which a member of the Bar had sought to restrain. In spite of his having decided against the Council and the Malaysian Bar on another matter involving almost similar issues and the same parties, the judge refused to disqualify himself from hearing the matter.

The law was being used to empower some judges to act with impunity. The High Court restrained the Malaysian Bar from proceeding to hold the two extraordinary general meetings mentioned, holding that discussing the allegations would subject the members of the Bar attending to prosecution for sedition or to committal for contempt of court, and that the Bar Council was acting *ultra vires* the Legal Profession Act 1976 in convening the meetings. An appeal against one of the decisions to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on the ground that the conduct of judges could not be discussed except in Parliament or in relation to an investigation by a tribunal appointed under Art 125 of the Constitution. An application for leave made to the Federal Court, to appeal further to that court, was dismissed as being without merit, notwithstanding the important constitutional issues raised, including the novel principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal. It would seem that the Chief Justice was being shielded from public scrutiny by some of his judges in the High Court who were normally assigned to hear them. The courts were being used to stop the Bar discussing the acts of impropriety alleged against the Chief Justice.

During the period Tun Eusoff was the Chief Justice, some High Court judges would insist that cases fixed for hearing before them took priority over cases fixed for hearing on the same dates before the Court of Appeal or the Federal Court. It was for counsel involved to apply for the matter in the appellate

court to be adjourned. Some judges reigned supreme: they were allowed to do so.

A fact-finding mission[11] which came to Malaysia to examine the relationship between the Executive, the Bar Council and the Judiciary, found that while there was no complaint about the independence of the judiciary in the vast majority of cases which came before the courts, there were, in cases considered to be of political or economic importance to the Executive, serious concerns that the Judiciary was not independent, and that this perception was also held by members of the general public. In its report[12] the mission urged the government to recognise the independent constitutional position of the judiciary and not to interfere with this independence in any way. It referred to the defamation proceedings instituted against Dato Param Cumaraswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and called on the Malaysian government and courts to heed the opinion of the International Court of Justice by affirming the immunity of the Special Rapporteur. It found the awards of damages in defamation cases to be of such magnitude as to be a means of stifling free speech and expression. It further cited the use of contempt proceeding against lawyers practising their profession as a serious obstacle to their ability to render their services freely. The report made the following, among other, recommendations:

- that the government should recognise the independent constitutional position of the judiciary and not interfere with this independence in any way;

- that the Judiciary should act and be seen to act with complete independence from the Executive;

- that the choice of judges in high profile cases be carefully considered;

[11] The mission comprised representatives of the International Bar Association, the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the International Commission of Jurists, the Commonwealth Lawyers' Association and the Union Internationale des Avocats.
[12] *Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia 2000.*

- that the Executive should refrain from speaking publicly about a trial before judgment has been delivered.

The government's immediate and expected reaction was to refute the findings of the fact-finding committee. But it was impossible to deny what was true: repeated denials could not make what was true false. What the report said was true and that had eventually to be acknowledged. The current Chief Justice, after coming into office, admitted that the judiciary was at its lowest ebb, a fact which everyone had known for quite some time.

Appointments: Who has the last say?

The procedure for appointing judges had remained the same as when this country gained its independence. The amendments which have been made to the relevant provisions of the Federal Constitution from time to time have been in the nature of modifications necessitated by the creation of Malaysia in 1963, by the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 and lastly by the creation of the Court of Appeal. Essentially, a person is eligible for appointment as a judge of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and any of the High Courts (of Malaya or Borneo) if he is a citizen and has for the ten years preceding his appointment been an advocate of those courts, or a member of the judicial and legal service of the Federation or of the legal service of a State, or sometimes one and sometimes another[13].

All judges are appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on the advice of the Prime Minister[14]. Before tendering his advice on the appointment of judges other than the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister is required to consult the Chief Justice[15]. For the appointment of the Chief Judge of a High Court (of Malaya and of Borneo), and of judges of the Court of Appeal and of each of the High Courts, the Prime Minister has also to consult the respective heads of

[13] Federal Constitution, Art 123.
[14] Ibid, Art 122B(1).
[15] Ibid, Art 122B(2).

those courts[16]. The Prime Minister is, however, not obliged to consult anyone when advising on the appointment of the Chief Justice.

Until the events of 1988, the procedure worked well. Previously the Prime Minister's advice on the appointment of judges other than the Lord President was given after consulting the Lord President. He would be the best person to know, from observation, which senior member of the Bar was suitable for appointment. As Lord President, Tun Mohamed Suffian made it a practice to himself consult the chairman of the Bar Council and very senior members of the Bar to sound them on proposed appointments. In one or two cases, the persons thought suitable were not recommended after the Lord President was informed of pending disciplinary proceedings against them. The informal consultation gave a certain measure of assurance that only persons of good character who had the respect of the Bar and whom the Lord President considered competent and suitable would be appointed as judges. In practice the Prime Minister accepted the recommendation of the Lord President and would advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong accordingly.

The very same procedure was used after Tun Salleh was dismissed in 1988 – but for a very different purpose. The practice of informally consulting the Bar Council was discontinued, possibly because many of the persons sought to be appointed would not have been considered to be suitable by the Bar: many did not have the seniority or experience. But their appointment was nevertheless recommended by the Lord President, not as judges but as judicial commissioners. Even when subsequently confirmed as judges, they lacked the stature of judges appointed directly to the High Court.

If public confidence in the judiciary is to be restored, the practice of appointing judicial commissioners should be discontinued. Although empowered to perform the functions of a High Court judge, judicial commissioners do not have the security of tenure necessary to ensure their independence. Courts of other jurisdictions have struck down decisions made by acting or temporary

[16] Ibid, Art 122B(4); but see Art 122B(3) for appointment of a Chief Judge of the High Court.

judges precisely on that ground. The appointment of judicial commissioners is not consistent with the requirement of an independent judiciary.

From the experience gained since 1988, the procedure for appointing judges as provided by Art 122 is clearly no longer appropriate. The authority which tenders the advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has to be one which is independent of the Executive, and impartial. The establishment of a Commission to recommend appointments may be the answer. The Commission should have among its members the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the Attorney-General and representatives of the judiciary and the Bar. Including two members of the public would promote transparency. How and by whom the two members of the public are to be chosen will be a problem, but not an insurmountable one if the desired objective is to have the judiciary back on even keel and regain public confidence.

It is premature to go into details regarding the sort of quality, level of experience and competency which a person should have to be eligible for appointment. A number of countries have laid down their requirements for judicial appointment. These can be used as the basis for laying down our own standards.

SESSIONS REPORT ON 'JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THE SAY?'

by Lim Cheow Wee*

Speaker: YM Raja Aziz Addruse

Panellists : The Hon Mr Justice Alex Chernov
Dato' Param Cumaraswamy
YM Raja Aziz Addruse

Chairman : Tan Sri Dato' Azmi Kamaruddin

Introduction

The session started at 11.00 am with the Chairman's speech on the illustrious career of the Speaker, YM Raja Aziz Addruse.

The Chairman commented that the topic of appointment of judges should include the area of selection of judges.

He further noted that our Constitution does not provide any mechanism for such selection.

Speech

The Speaker raises the question as to why we need to raise the issue of appointment of judges 45 years after independence.

He went on to speak on the history of the judiciary which was inherited from the British system. It used to be the case that the judiciary was highly respected.

Essentially, a judge is appointed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong after the recommendation of the Prime Minister in consultation with the Chief Justice of Malaya.

The Speaker opined that our judges command respect by their counterparts in other countries through their participation in international law conferences.

Similarly the public held the judiciary in high esteem.

It was no surprise that the practice of appealing to the Privy Council (PC) was discontinued as the performance of the Federal Court was such that fewer cases were appealed to the PC.

In 1988, in what was termed as the Executive assault on the judiciary left a black mark in the history of our judiciary .The Speaker stated that the assault started long before the 1988 event took place. The Speaker then read an excerpt from his paper on page 2 on the speech made by the PM in moving a Bill to amend the Printing and Publications Act 1984.

The Speaker then elaborated on the events of May 1988 where the PM under Article 125 of the Federal Constitution made a representation to the Yang DiPertuan Agong to dismiss the Lord President on the ground of misbehaviour.

A Tribunal was set up comprising of the Speaker of the Lower House, the Chief Justice (as Chairman of the Tribunal) who was next in line in the hierarchy in the event the LP was dismissed, CJ of Borneo, a retired judge, the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka and a judge from Singapore.

The Bar Council sent a delegation to see Tun Hamid Omar to request him to decline the appointment but Tun Hamid refused on the ground that it was a Royal command.

Five Judges who had granted an interim order to restrain the Tribunal from submitting the report to the King were subsequently suspended.

The public began to question the integrity of Tun Hamid.

The Speaker then read an excerpt from page 5 of his report on the observation made by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and also comments by Geoffrey Robertson, QC.

More questionable events took place after the appointment of Tun Hamid viz two 'sensitive' cases were fixed early for disposal.

Tun Hamid also stopped the practice of consulting senior members of the Bar on suitability of candidates for appointment to the Bench.

A new practice was adopted where certain members were appointed as Judicial Commissioners solely on the discretion of the new LP.

The Speaker further commented that the practice of holding Counsels in contempt of court became rampant which led Tun Suffian to lament that the condition of the judiciary is such that he is afraid to appear before the judges especially if he is innocent.

The Judiciary was certainly seen to be at its lowest ebb when the new LP took over.

The Bar Council on the other hand could not discuss such issues because there would be a member of the Bar who would apply for an injunction to stop such meetings on the basis that it would be seditious.

The Court of Appeal in one of the cases even opined that the only way to discuss the conduct of the judges is in the Parliament.

***What is then to be done*?**

The procedure of appointment which was suitable prior to 1988 is now no more applicable.

The Speaker proposed the set up of a Judicial Service Commission comprising members who are impartial. However he warned that it all depends on the political will of the present government because without its support it will serve no useful purpose.

(The speech ended at 11.50 am.) The Chairman then invited the floor to address the panellists.

Ms Chew Swee Yoke from the KL Bar commented that the attendance at this colloquium reflects the moral fatigue experienced by the Bar. She queried as to whether there can be a check and balance by foreign judiciary.

Justice Alex replied that the appointment of QC for instance has always been an absolute mystery and no one is happy with how selection is done sometimes. However he cautioned that foreign judiciary is always slow and reluctant to interfere in other jurisdictions.

Mr Ngan Siong Hing from the Perak Bar then commented that the local judiciary has gone backwards. He asked 'how do we make the judges realise that they are human being as well'

Dato' Param replied that the trend in more jurisdiction is towards transparency and gave the example of Philippines where there is an independent mechanism to appoint judges. He was of the view that it is a reasonably good system. This is also done in Quebec but there the AG has too much say. He stated that the international standard for selection must be an objective one. In England there is a proposal to set up a Performance Commission to evaluate judges' performance. Judges are expected to have the highest quality and they are to set the highest standard of how people in a society should behave between themselves.

Ms Angie Ng from KL Bar then added that the public's attitude towards what is going on in the judiciary is sad.

The Chairman interjected by saying that judges are human beings too. He was most concerned if a judge does not listen or refuse Counsels to submit in court.

Justice Alex then stated that it is the duty of the Bar to persistently and consistently pursue a satisfactory system of selection of judges.

Mr Yeo Yang Poh from the Johor Bar likened going to the court like going to a tennis game. He feels that the Bar must take a practical step, ie by making the environment better which will eventually improve the judicial temperament. He suggested that we should set up a system where observers are sent to sit in the courts in all states. He further supported Ms Chew's proposal that international measures should be implemented.

Ms Chew Swee Yoke then voiced that a lot of unhappiness amongst the judges in the recent elevation. She questioned as to how does the mechanism really work. She disagreed with Justice Alex's view that a foreign country should not interfere in another country's appointment.

The Chairman reiterated his view that one must make sure that the No. 1 judge is suitable and the rest will follow suit.

Dato' Param then added that at a meeting of the Bar two years ago, the conduct of a particular judge was discussed and he had proposed that lawyers submit their report on judges which they had encountered in their daily attendances at court. The Bar then should prepare a dossier and submit the same to the CJ.

The talk ended at 12.45 pm with words of thanks to the Speaker and panellists.
