©New Straits Times
(Used by permission)
by Kevin Y.L. Tan
KEVIN Y.L. TAN looks at the circumstances surrounding Singapore’s separation
from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965
FROM the outset, Singapore was treated differently from the
other Malay states. The two governments agreed, in a memorandum setting out
heads of agreement for a merger between the federation of Malaya and Singapore
on Nov 15 , 1961, that:
"Singapore will be a state within the federation but on special conditions and
with a larger measure of local autonomy than the other states forming the
federation. Defence, external affairs and security will be the responsibility of
the federation government; education and labour that of the Singapore
government."
Among the many "special provisions" granted to Singapore were the issue of
citizenship and nationality. Singapore citizens would retain their state
citizenship, but would not automatically become citizens of the federation.
Instead, they were considered "nationals" of the federation, who would "have
equal rights, carry the same passport, enjoy the same protection and be subject
to the equal duties and responsibilities under the constitution of the larger
federation".
This provision differed significantly from the citizenship
provisions of other states, notably Penang and Malacca — which up to 1946 formed
part of the Straits Settlements with Singapore — where citizens were given
automatic federal citizenship.
Finally, the proposals exempted Singapore’s finances from the federation
constitution’s financial provisions. The federal government had jurisdiction
over all national monetary policy and power of taxation on all taxes of national
character.
Singapore was given greater latitude in financial matters and greater state
reserve powers because of its autonomy over labour and education. These
provisions generated a great controversy, and in many ways, led to break–up of
the union.
The agreement relating to Malaysia was finally prepared and circulated, together
with the Malaysia Bill, on July 9, 1963. On Aug 26, the Yang di–Pertuan Agong
gave his royal assent to the Malaysia Bill, and on Aug 29, the king signed a
proclamation fixing Sept 16 as Malaysia Day.
Malaysia Day was originally fixed for June 1, 1963 but was changed to Aug 31 to
coincide with the sixth anniversary of the federation’s independence. A further
postponement was engendered by (Indonesian president) Sukarno’s challenge to the
Malaysia plan.
To give the United Nations team time to determine if Malaysia was being formed
against the will of the Borneo peoples, (Malayan prime minister) Tunku Abdul
Rahman agreed to postpone Malaysia Day till Sept 16, 1963.
These postponements irritated (Singapore’s prime minister) Lee Kuan Yew who
criticised Tunku’s decision to postpone Malaysia Day and ignored Tunku’s strong
advice by urging Sabah and Sarawak to proclaim their de facto independence on
Aug 31. On Aug 31, 1963 — Malaysia Solidarity Day — he declared Singapore
independent.
At a micro–level, Lee had not shown sufficient respect and loyalty to the
central government by failing to heed Tunku’s advice; at a macro–level, it
revealed the People’s Action Party (PAP) government’s insensitivity to the
Alliance leaders and to Malayans generally.
Tunku and his Alliance comrades considered Singapore’s inclusion as nothing more
than the admission of a new entity on the federal government’s terms and
indulgence.
On the other hand, Lee and his PAP comrades viewed the creation of Malaysia as
the inauguration of a new state altogether, a state which was fair game in the
political and economic stakes, entitling him to extend the PAP’s influence into
the peninsula.
Several reasons account for Singapore’s sudden exit from the federation. The
first was economic.
The federation expected Singapore to make a substantial financial contribution
towards federal finance as well as loans to aid development in Sabah and
Sarawak. The more it could extract from Singapore, the lighter the federal
financial burden.
High on Singapore’s agenda was the establishment of a common market, as its
industrialisation programme required a large enough market for its manufactured
goods within the federation.
This was viewed with far less enthusiasm by federation politicians keen to
compete against Singapore in the industrial sector.
The second factor leading to Singapore’s secession was the vastly different
political personalities and approaches on both sides of the Causeway.
Lee’s PAP adopted an open and aggressive style, appealing directly to the voter
while the Tunku’s Alliance preferred a more conciliatory approach, with "the
airing of differences behind closed doors, in more confidential and secretive
surroundings".
By openly confronting and defying the federal government, PAP demonstrated to
the electorate that it had their interests at heart and was prepared to fight
for the best possible terms of merger.
Finally, PAP’s attempt to supplant the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) as a
partner in the Alliance led to full–scale political warfare between the two
Chinese–dominated parties.
By February 1965, the verbal conflict between PAP and the Alliance escalated
further. At Umno’s 18th general assembly on May 15, a resolution was unanimously
passed demanding the arrest and detention of Lee.
By July 22, the situation seemed irretrievable and Tun–ku, convalescing in
France, received a cable from (his deputy) Tun Abdul Razak saying that the
senior cabinet members agreed with him that Singapore should go its own way.
Razak was told to "proceed with the necessary legal chores and the amendments to
the constitution" and Razak replied that he would convene parliament on Aug 9 to
"go through the readings of an amending bill on a certificate of urgency".
Tunku returned to Kuala Lumpur on Aug 5. The next day, (finance minister) Goh
Keng Swee and other Singapore leaders were informed about Tunku’s decision to
separate and Lee, who was holidaying in the Cameron Highlands, hurried to Kuala
Lumpur.
Lee and Goh informed Tunku that PAP chairman Toh Chin Chye and (minister of
culture) S. Rajaratnam were unwilling to sign the separation agreement and they
asked Tunku to write Toh a brief note. In this now historic letter, Tunku told
Toh that "in the interest of our friendship and security and peace of Malaysia
as a whole, there is absolutely no other way out" and if he did not accept the
agreement, the situation might go out of control. Toh accepted.
The drafting of the separation agreement was left to a negotiation team headed
by Goh and Singapore’s law minister E.W. Barker. On the Malaysian side were
Razak, (minister for external affairs and home affairs) Tun Dr Ismail Abdul
Rahman, attorney–general Kadir Yusof, finance minister (Tun) Tan Siew Sin and
(minister of works, posts and telecommunications Tun) V.T. Sambanthan.
In the meantime, the British High Commissioner Lord Head had been kept in the
dark. When he found out, he frantically went in search of Tunku to try to
salvage the situation.
It was only at 3am that Head found him in a friend’s penthouse. By then, it was
too late.
A Royal Malaysian Air Force jet had been sent to Singapore on Aug 7 to secure
the rest of the Singapore cabinet’s signatures to the separation agreement and
it returned to Kuala Lumpur on Aug 8.
The next day, the Malaysian parliament was summoned at 9.30am and the Alliance
members were told to vote for the bill to ensure a two–thirds majority necessary
for a constitutional amendment.
At 10am, when division was sounded, Singapore became an independent, sovereign
state.
Dr Kevin Y.L. Tan, a former associate professor at the National University of
Singapore’s Faculty of Law, runs a consultancy on history and heritage in
Singapore. This is the fifth in a six–part series of excerpts from
‘Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: The First 50 Years, 1957 – 2007’, by
LexisNexis Malaysia. For details, log onto
www.lexisnexis.com.my