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13TH BIENNIAL MALAYSIAN LAW CONFERENCE
ADDRESS BY ©MR CHAN SEK KEONG
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF SINGAPORE ON 18TH NOVEMBER 2005
GLOBALISING THE LEGAL PROFESSION  1 I am delighted to be here this morning to speak on the subject “Globalising the Legal Profession”. I thank the Bar Council of Malaysia for giving me the privilege to do so. Your President has requested that I address the following issues which, he believes, would be of greatest interest to participants at this Conference, namely,
(a) The effect of the globalisation of legal services on the legal profession in Singapore, and on other sectors of Singapore’s economy;
(b) A comparison between liberalisation under WTO/GATS and FTAs;
(c) The different modalities of liberalisation (e.g., FLA, JLV) and their respective strengths and weaknesses;
(d) What lies ahead for Singapore and countries in the region.
2 My experience on this subject covers two periods of about 30 years - first, from the late 1970s until 1986 as a private practitioner and second, from 1992 until today as the regulator of Singapore-based foreign lawyers. I hope that what I have to say will be useful to the Bar Council in its task to formulate an appropriate response to the challenge of globalisation of legal services in line with the spirit of “Malaysia Boleh”. But, before I begin, I wish to enter the caveat that the views I express here are my own and are not necessarily those of the Government of Singapore.
How has the globalisation of legal services affected the legal profession in Singapore?
3 I can summarise the current situation as follows. The entry of foreign law firms into Singapore started in the early 1970’s and picked up speed steadily after 1980. This incipient globalisation was later met with a robust response from Singapore lawyers and catalysed the profession to put its house in order through restructuring and modernisation. The challenge of the US and English law firms (which I will hereafter refer to collectively as “the Atlantic law firms”) was viewed very seriously by the profession in the light of the Singapore Government’s objective to promote Singapore as an international financial centre. It affected profoundly, even traumatically, the psyche of Singapore lawyers in exposing their vulnerability in the face of global standards of service delivery, management and marketing skills of the Atlantic law firms and their so-called “cutting edge” know-how in documenting and structuring international financial transactions which originated in New York and London. Singapore corporate lawyers changed very quickly, and dramatically, their focus on the ways to deliver legal services competitively. It led to the emergence of large Singapore law firms which have since become meaningful players in the banking, corporate finance and securities sectors in Singapore. Currently, their legal capability and competitive pricing in executing financial transactions are generally recognised by domestic and international consumers in Singapore.
4 Structural and other changes made to legal practice, such as the requirement of minimum classes of law degrees to qualify for practice, the abolition of scale fees for conveyancing, and the introduction in 1999 of the JLV and FLA schemes, have led to all round improvements in the quality of legal services, and to greater investment in technology, and in raising management, marketing and professional skills. The one-stop shop service for the supply of foreign laws and Singapore law in cross-border transactions was able to meet the market needs of the global financial institutions and multi-national companies. Today, the concern of Singapore lawyers that they would be marginalised or lose their autonomy has somewhat receded. Indeed, Singapore law firms have made such great strides in acquiring new and improved legal skills and efficiency in the last 10 years that they have the confidence to think about how to regionalise their services.
5 Today, Singapore is host to 63 foreign law firms and 6 representative offices from 17 jurisdictions, namely, Austria, Australia, Bermuda, China, Germany, France, Holland, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Singapore has benefited from this influx of foreign lawyers that currently number 286 private practitioners and 137 in-house counsel from all over the world. The legal services sector is diversified and vibrant and is able to supply the legal needs of the region in all important economic sectors, such as banking and financial services, air and marine transport, logistics and distribution, oil and gas exploration, energy and power distribution, manufacturing and information technology and biotechnology.
6 Before discussing how Singapore achieved this state of affairs, it may be useful to examine the historical conditions that have enabled the Atlantic law firms to globalise their legal services so pervasively in such a short period of time. The conditions that have made this possible also demonstrate that it is not only futile for developing countries to resist them but it could also be contrary to their own economic interests. Developing countries can benefit from their presence. It was only because Singapore understood well the nature of this challenge that she has succeeded in striking a balance between accommodating the needs of foreign investors for foreign law services and the need for meaningful local law firm competencies.
7 The title of the Conference theme is instructive. It is “Globalising the Legal Profession” and not “Liberalising the Legal Profession”. What is the difference? It is natural for Anglo-American lawyers and commentators to think in terms of globalising their legal services rather than liberalising them since they see their role as exporters of legal services and not as importers of legal services. They export their legal services to countries which need the financial resources of their established financial clients. Asian countries seeking foreign investments have no choice but to accept the financial and legal services that come packaged together. These countries do not have legal services to globalise, but only markets to liberalise.
8 Globalisation is said to be irreversible. So it is, but it does not necessarily have identical effects on every sector of a country’s economy. It is also claimed that countries that resist the tide of globalisation will be overwhelmed and washed away.1 That is a powerful metaphor, but again an overstatement. Globalisation, if it is fair and equitable to developing countries, is a force for good. This is equally true for the globalisation of legal services. Singapore has benefited from it. If Singapore had rejected foreign law services, it would have inflicted substantial damage on its own financial services sector. What this implies is that the power of governments in small countries to regulate the activities of the global law firms is tempered by their usefulness to their national economies. Furthermore, the global reach of the Atlantic law firms also means that they can service the foreign law needs of country A from country B. This is why it is better to come to terms with their ubiquity rather than to deny their reach.
9 How did this state of affairs come about? I will quote a short passage from an article “The Battle of the Atlantic” published in The Economist (February 26-March 3, 2000) that explains it all, clearly and succinctly. The passage reads: If global law giants are ever to emerge, they are likely to grow out of the top-tier New York and London firms. These are the firms that already advise the world’s biggest companies and banks. They cream off the best business in two of the world’s three biggest capital markets, which generate the most lucrative legal work. They work in English, the language of international business. More significantly, for historical reasons and because companies everywhere want to tap the London and New York capital markets, a growing proportion of international business is conducted under English and American law, even when the firms involved are continental European or Asian.
10 This passage summarises the basic factors that have made the legal services of the Atlantic law firms an essential part of global financial services. Many US and English lawyers justify the global dominance of US and English laws on the grounds that their laws are well developed and rich in case law, and therefore predictable, that their laws are efficient in protecting and enforcing property rights, that their courts are impartial and objective in their adjudications, that their lawyers are competent and efficient, and so on. All these points are generally true. What is usually left unsaid is why and how US or English law was selected as the preferred governing law in the first place, and who selected them and why: factors such as long established professional relationships, cultural affinities and preferences, familiarity with and confidence in one’s own legal systems, or the role of the US Dollar as a reserve currency and the currency of global financings. The combined effect of these factors makes this circle of choice-expertise-choice of these law firms unbreakable and ensures their continuing dominance in global financial markets.
11 The Atlantic law firms have no competitors except among themselves. There are no foreseeable new entrants to this market because the world’s largest capital markets and international investors rely on their services to protect and enforce their rights and interests.2 Every year, they play musical chairs in global rankings. We only need to look at their annual revenues to see what we are up against if they are allowed full access to the domestic legal services market. The 2004 issue of “The Lawyer Global 100” estimated that the top 25 US and UK law firms had revenues ranging from ₤950 million to ₤350.3 million. The firm with the largest number of lawyers (about 3,000) was reported to have earned ₤694 million. These are global-scale businesses supplying the legal services preferred by the financial markets. In contrast, Singapore’s legal services sector, with a total of about 3,700 lawyers (including offshore lawyers), only managed to earn gross revenues of about S$1 billion in 2004.
12 Their rapid spread to Asia in the last 20 years resulted from the dynamic growth of economies of South East Asia and North East Asia. How have Asian countries responded to the growing hegemony of the Atlantic law firms? Their responses have varied from outright rejection to calibrated accommodation, according to what national interests require. Japan, the second largest economy in the world, has recently decided to allow Japanese law firms to merge with foreign law firms, and also to allow foreign law firms to employ Japanese lawyers to provide legal services in Japanese law. Presumably, Japan feels that it now has a sufficient number of major Japanese law firms, either as independent firms or in joint ventures to serve the legal needs of Japanese businesses. Singapore’s initial response was to allow foreign law firms to supply the legal needs of their financial clients in the offshore market, and later in 2000 to enter into joint ventures and formal alliances with Singapore law firms. Hong Kong’s legal services sector was fully open to the entry of English law firms as it was a British colony. Later, it was opened up to US law firms.3 Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have continued to deny entry to foreign lawyers. Thailand had earlier allowed in foreign law firms to supply only foreign law services in Thailand, but in 2003 decided to liberalise its market completely by allowing foreign law firms to merge with local law firms and to employ Thai lawyers to provide Thai law services. It is in our interest to monitor the Thai experience periodically to see the effects of full liberalisation on the Thai legal services sector.
The case of China
13 China currently provides the greatest potential for the Atlantic law firms to expand their business in Asia. India is a story for the future. China’s response has something useful to tell us, and I would like to make some observations on it first before I turn to Singapore’s experience.
14 China’s response mirrors that of Singapore at a similar stage of their economic development. When China opened up its markets to foreign investments, the Atlantic law firms followed their home-based clients. There was no doubt that China needed foreign law services to accelerate the pace of foreign investments. But China, always suspicious of foreign powers, acted very cautiously. Up to 1990, more than a decade of opening up its economy, China had only allowed in a handful of foreign law firms, as representative offices. Whilst Singapore welcomed all foreign law firms, China selected those she wanted, notwithstanding the fact that she herself had no legal profession to speak of. The question of providing Chinese law services was irrelevant as the Chinese legal framework was still in the making. But China was determined to build up its own legal resources as quickly as possible. She implemented a massive programme to produce more lawyers, setting up many law schools and sending large numbers of Chinese students abroad to study law. Today, China has more than 120,000 qualified lawyers with law degrees from overseas and domestic law schools.
15 China’s accession to the WTO led to the influx of more foreign law firms. This was matched by the phenomenal growth of Chinese law firms. Their current sizes are impressive by regional standards. Her largest law firm has more than 300 lawyers. She has 5 law firms with a 100 lawyers or more, all this achieved within a short period of about 5 years. Her lawyers are also getting more confident of their competence in supplying China’s legal needs. Indeed, two of the largest Chinese law firms have recently set up offices in Hong Kong to service their international clients. Presently, there are thousands of Chinese students studying law in the US, Europe and the two antipodean states. They will return to China armed with knowledge of both the common law and civil law which they will use to challenge the dominance of the Atlantic law firms within China.
16 Since economic power and market size can determine which law should be the governing law, Chinese law may well be preferred as a governing law for certain types of business transactions. Given China’s history of foreign domination and national pride as to her place in the world, it is difficult to see China allowing foreign law firms to provide legal services in Chinese law at any foreseeable time, if at all. Nor is it likely that the Atlantic law firms will ever be in a position to pressurise China on this issue. Chinese lawyers believe that one day, not too distant away, they might be able to challenge the duopoly of the Atlantic law firms in supplying legal services to China and other Asian states. This will be accelerated if ever the Yuan becomes a reserve currency or the currency for international financings, and if international investors have confidence in China’s legal system and if Chinese law is accepted as a governing law for international financial transactions.
Singapore’s Response
17 Let me now describe Singapore’s response. In 1968, Singapore established the “Asian-Dollar Market”, which was the Asian equivalent of the older Euro-Dollar Market based in London. It provided a domicile for US Dollars held outside the US. In March 1972, the Minister for Finance announced Singapore’s plans to develop itself into a centre for "brain services" and to promote the growth of the money market. Legislative and regulatory measures were put in place to attract financial institutions to set up operations in Singapore. These measures were successful in transforming Singapore into a regional financial centre within a short period of time. Singapore was then beginning to industrialise, and Indonesia was also seeking foreign investments to develop its natural resources. The Asian Dollar was an important source of finance in the region. As the major lending banks were US and English banks, their lawyers, namely, the Atlantic law firms, naturally used New York law or English law as the governing law for the relevant financial transactions.
18 US lawyers were the first to recognise the importance of the Asian-Dollar Market to their legal services. As early as 1972, they began to lobby the Economic Development Board to allow them to set up practices in Singapore. By end 1972, 4 US law firms with 6 lawyers, had been allowed to do so. By early 1974, only one firm, Coudert Brothers, remained, as the licences of the other law firms were terminated. In December 1978, another US law firm, Graham & James, was allowed to set up practice in Singapore.
19 English law firms also saw the opportunity to expand their practices. Aided by their financial clients, they also lobbied for entry into Singapore. Their cause was supported by a prominent expatriate lawyer who publicly declared that Singapore lawyers did not have sufficient legal expertise in international loans, but without making clear what law he was referring to. In April 1980, the Government suddenly announced that an English law firm, Freshfields4, would be allowed to set up a practice in Singapore law. This decision raised strong protests from the legal profession.
20 One month later, the Monetary Authority of Singapore sent a circular to all banks in Singapore to inform them that they were free to bring in lawyers of their choice from New York, London or Hong Kong to Singapore to service their Asian Dollar bonds, loan syndication and other offshore transactions. Between 1981 and 1986, 24 foreign law firms from various jurisdictions had been brought into Singapore by their financial clients. From 1987 to October 1997 the number of foreign law firms more than doubled to 49. A surge in applications occurred in 1994 and 1995, following the UK Government’s decision to return sovereignty of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. Singapore was considered a convenient fall-back base for English law firms based in Hong Kong.
21 The rationale for welcoming foreign law services, particularly from the Atlantic law firms, was economic necessity. Without them, Singapore’s objective to become a regional financial centre would have been jeopardised. Without their services, all regional financings would have been done out of Hong Kong by their offices in Hong Kong. The rationale for not giving them a Singapore law practice was equally compelling. Singapore law has no natural role in the offshore financial services market. However, the exclusion of foreign law firms from the domestic market led to the misperception of protectionism. But the presence of foreign businesses in Singapore cannot, in itself, give their lawyers the right to practise Singapore law. In any case, the rightful role of Singapore law as the governing law for domestic transactions is somewhat reduced by the market preference for the application of English law as the governing law for many, especially large, domestic transactions, even where there are no foreign elements. Their restricted practices have not been a serious factor in preventing the Atlantic law firms from engaging in domestic transactions by the device of substituting a foreign law as the governing law. These two factors, i.e., the irrelevance of Singapore law services in global financings and its attenuated role even in domestic transactions, make a very strong case for striking a positive balance, rather than a zero sum balance, between the interests of the offshore and the domestic legal services sector.
22 The division of the legal services sector into two distinct sectors - the offshore sector for international financial services and the onshore sector for domestic services – worked well. But around 1997, some concern was expressed that Singapore lawyers were not able to provide efficient Singapore law services for cross-border financial transactions, thus putting at risk Singapore’s role as an international financial centre. The Government appointed a review committee to investigate this concern with the following terms of reference:
“to review Singapore’s strategic legal needs in the financial sector, and the conditions under which foreign law firms and foreign lawyers are allowed to operate in Singapore, in the context of ensuring Singapore’s competitiveness in financial services.”
23 After a thorough study of the evidence, which included extensive feedback from all the main players in both the financial and legal services sectors, the Review Committee found that the concern was exaggerated. The Review Committee also made a number of important findings on the roles of foreign lawyers and Singapore lawyers in ensuring Singapore’s competitiveness in financial services. Among these findings are the following:
(a) Singapore’s strategic legal needs lie in increasing the number of Singapore-based global law firms, particularly the Global 100 law firms5;
(b) Singapore law has no external demand, and is required in cross-border transactions where there is a Singapore connection, e.g., where Singapore assets are used as security or the borrower is a Singapore company;
(c) if foreign law firms were allowed to supply Singapore law services for domestic transactions, it would only result in server substitution and higher servicing fees: it would hollow out Singapore law firms of talent through “cherry picking” and eventually marginalise them, to Singapore’s detriment as a nation state.
24 The Report of the Review Committee contains an in-depth analysis of the case for and against6 the full liberalisation of the domestic legal services market of a small economy, which also functions as an Asian financial centre. The Bar Council might want to study the Report for its relevance to the Malaysian situation, for the following reasons. First, it is a measured and principled response to the challenge of globalisation of US and English law services. It identifies the realities of the financial markets from the structuring of financial products to their end sale and the roles of the financial and legal advisers, especially the latter in determining the governing law of these products. Secondly, the Report also explains why Singapore law services are not critical to the growth of Singapore’s financial centre and that allowing foreign lawyers to provide Singapore law services does not make it more competitive vis-a-vis other financial centres in Asia. Thirdly, the Report also explains why full liberalisation would not lead to greater use of Singapore law services for international financial services, or increase the size of the domestic legal services market. Fourthly, the Report identifies the “one-stop shop” service as an efficient way to deliver foreign and Singapore law services for cross-border financial transactions, thus negating any need for foreign lawyers to provide Singapore law services.
25 Singapore responded to the globalisation of US and English law services in the way it has done to serve her national economic interest. Because she needs the services of the Atlantic law firms, just as their global financial clients need them, Singapore has liberalised her legal services markets to the extent necessary to meet her economic needs. This policy allows foreign law firms to compete among themselves, and ensures that they do not control the domestic legal services and marginalise domestic law firms. This policy has been labelled protectionist from time to time, but it is defensible in the case of Singapore.
26 In a recent speech made at the recent Commonwealth Law Conference held in London in September 2005, the Chairman of the Law Society of England pointed to vested interests as the cause of protectionism in many emerging markets. He said that UK law firms would be able to “bring specialist expertise that is not available locally in areas such as capital markets, project financing and construction. Allowing foreign legal practice can therefore help countries in raising their own global competitiveness”. If he is referring to specialist expertise in English law, there is much truth in it, although whether it can raise that country’s competitiveness is unclear. But the statement is misplaced if it refers to expertise in domestic law in a jurisdiction such as Singapore which has a developed legal system with a mature legal profession with the capability to provide such expertise. A good illustration is the capability of Singapore law firms to structure Singapore property REITs. Similarly, a leading Malaysian law firm has also structured the first ever REIT to be listed on Bursa Malaysia. Singapore lawyers are the natural leaders in the supply of Singapore law services, just as the Atlantic law firms are the natural leaders in supplying US and English law. The case for these law firms being allowed to provide domestic law services may be justified if the domestic legal system is undeveloped or if its lawyers lack capability in its own laws. But a country at this stage of development is unlikely to generate the kinds or volume of financial transactions that would interest foreign lawyers.
Singapore, WTO/GATS and FTAs
27 The basic principle under the WTO/GATS regime is that each WTO member must be accorded treatment no less favourable than any other member (the GATS “MFN” principle), except for any service sector for which a specific exemption from the MFN requirement has been taken. A member can make sectoral commitments under GATS for access for the service providers of other member states subject to the GATS MFN principle. However, commitments made by any Member under any bilateral or regional FTAs with other Members are not subject to the GATS MFN principle but may be subject to any MFN provision in the FTA concerned.
28 Since 1995, Singapore has taken an indefinite MFN exemption for all measures pertaining to the provision of legal services in Singapore for all countries. The justification for this is that the entry of foreign law firms into the Singapore market is based on a case by case basis approval. On sectoral commitments, Singapore has made no commitments for legal services for both foreign laws and domestic laws. This was justified on the need to control the inflow of lawyers into Singapore as: (a) she already restricts her own citizens from entering an over-crowded domestic legal profession; (b) the free admission of foreign lawyers, especially from Commonwealth countries would undermine this policy and lead to indirect discrimination against her own citizens; (c) the current policy allows foreign lawyers to provide legal services in home country law.
29 The GATS regime deals with four modes of delivery of services. They are:
Mode 1: cross-border supply – where a service supplier resident in country A provides services cross-border into country B, for example, by mail, fax, telephone or e-mail. This would be the case where, for example, a Singapore lawyer obtains a legal opinion from a QC resident in London.
Mode 2: consumption abroad – when a service supplier resident in country A provides services in country A to a resident of country B. This would be the case where, for example, Singapore Airlines obtains a legal opinion in London from an English QC resident in London.
Mode 3: commercial presence – when a service supplier from country A establishes a presence in country B to provide services in country B. This is the case where, for example, a law firm from country A sets up a law practice in country B to provide legal services in home country law, third country law, international law and/or host country law.
Mode 4: movement of natural persons – where individual service suppliers from country A enter country B to provide services in country B. This is the case where an English lawyer enters Singapore to provide legal services in home country law, third country law, international law and/or host country law.
30 It can be readily seen that although Singapore has made no commitments on legal services under the GATS, her current policy on foreign lawyers meets all the 4 modes of service delivery under the GATS, subject to one exception, the right to provide Singapore law services under Mode 3. Singapore’s principal concern with the globalisation of legal services is with this exception, and to a lesser extent with Mode 4 as it would allow all Commonwealth lawyers free access to her legal services market.
31 Bilateral or regional FTAs under the GATS regime should be GATS Plus. FTAs must give more than what is committed under GATS, as otherwise they would be pointless. Under all her FTAs with New Zealand, Japan, Australia, EFTA, the USA, Jordan, Brunei, New Zealand/Chile and India, Singapore has either made no commitments with regard to the legal services sector generally or has made reservations with respect to Singapore law services. However, Singapore has made commitments on the recognition of foreign law degrees obtained by Singapore citizens and permanent citizens for law practice in Singapore. The number of such law schools recognised is as follows: Australia – 10, (actually an additional 6 to the 4 already recognised unilaterally by Singapore earlier), US – 4; New Zealand – 2 (unilateral and not under FTA). For the US and Australia, Singapore has also committed to relaxing some of the conditions governing the operation of JLVs.
32 The WTO negotiations on legal services commitments are still ongoing. They have not been met with enthusiasm from a large number of developing countries which see no benefits to their economies in liberalising their legal services market to foreign lawyers, particularly those from the global law firms.
Modalities of liberalisation
33 Singapore’s modalities to liberalise the legal services sector may be summarised as follows: (a) foreign law firms may supply legal services in foreign laws; (b) foreign lawyers may supply foreign law services as consultants and associates in Singapore law firms; (c) foreign law firms may enter into JLVs and FLAs to supply legal services in all laws in banking and corporate finance; and (d) foreign lawyers may be employed as in-house counsel by all Singapore-based enterprises to supply legal services in all laws. In a JLV, a foreign lawyer may supply legal services in Singapore law only if he has passed a prescribed 5-hour examination on the corporate and securities laws of Singapore. Since 2000, when the examination was prescribed, no foreign lawyer has applied to take the examination.
34 The distinction between a JLV and a FLA is significant, although they share certain privileges, such as being able to market themselves as having Singapore law capability (as asset for a global law firm) and to send a single bill for services rendered. Basically, the JLV is designed to allow a foreign lawyer to practise Singapore law (if he passes a qualifying examination), but in a FLA he is allowed to prepare all the documentation for the transaction without the right to advise on Singapore law. Also, the JLV partners can organise their services and share their fees as they like, subject to certain limits; however, joint management is essential to prevent an invisible takeover of the Singapore partner, or “Ali Baba” arrangements: a merger is prohibited to preserve the identity of the Singapore firm in the event of a break-up; the foreign partner must provide training to Singapore lawyers and to transfer expertise and provide transactional experience to Singapore lawyers in Tier-1 and Tier-2 legal work. The most important structural change is the establishment of the one-stop shop service for cross-border financial transactions.
What lies ahead for Singapore and other countries in the region?
35 Japan and Thailand have succumbed to the pressures of globalisation of foreign law services. Indonesia is either not ready or not prepared to do so for the time being, although she has apparently put an offer on the table for the current Doha round of WTO/GATS negotiations on services. India’s legal profession, with its huge pool of lawyers, has signalled its strong opposition to any form of liberalisation.
36 That leaves Malaysia whose response can only be what her national interest requires. This means that any case advanced by the legal profession, whether for or against liberalisation, and the extent of such liberalisation, must accord with the national interest and not its own sectional interest. In this connection, the Bar Council, in formulating its response to the challenge of globalisation of legal services, might want to consider the relevance of the following statement made by Singapore at a GATS Council for Trade in Services meeting held on 25 February 2005. The relevant part of the statement reads:
“liberalisation of services must take into account the legitimate role of the respective governments of all WTO Members to intervene to offset market failures and to achieve non-economic and social objectives, such as the need to take into account whether the size of the domestic legal services market allows room for the practice of domestic or host country law by foreign law firms and foreign lawyers; the need to attract and retain local legal talent so as to build up a strong local Bar with sound knowledge of local culture, customs and circumstances for key government and judicial appointments; and allowing domestic law firms the opportunity to improve its quality of services by collaborating or associating with foreign law firms subject to conditions such as transfer of legal skills and knowledge as well as training of domestic lawyers by the foreign law firms involved in any such collaboration or association.”
I wish you the best in your deliberations on the theme of this Conference.
1 See Phillip Stephens: “Leaders sink or swim with the irresistible tide of globalization” Financial Times, September 30, 2005.
2 See “The Battle of the Atlantic – The world’s leading law firms, based in New York and London disagree about the best way to respond to globalization” Economist (February 26-March 3, 2000).
3 Today, the Hong Kong legal services market for international financings is dominated by English and US law firms. Home-grown law firms only have a secondary role in this area of practice.
4 In October 1986 the Government gave Freshfields two years’ notice to wind up its Singapore law practice. Freshfields stayed on as an offshore firm.
5 The Global 100 consists of the top 100 law firms in the world, either in terms of revenues, profits or number of revenue earners.
6 I wish to add that two of the private sector lawyers on the Committee, Dr Philip Pillai of Shook Lin & Bok and John Koh of Goldman Sachs, Singapore, provided many insights on the global legal services market and made many valuable contributions to the Report.
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