Articles & Judgments Selected Judgments Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors 2007 [CA] 
| Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors 2007 [CA] |
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| Monday, 16 July 2007 12:20pm | |
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DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA Coram : Gopal Sri Ram, J.C.A. JUDGMENT OF GOPAL SRI RAM, J.C.A 1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother Raus Sharif in draft and agree with his conclusion he has arrived at and the orders he proposes to make in this appeal. However I wish to give my own reasons in addition to those already given by my learned brother. The first has to do with the value of Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 1 MLJ 241 as binding precedent. The second is this. Even if the decision in Adorna Properties is good law, does what was there held apply to the facts of this case? In order to deal with the first point, it is necessary to hearken to the statutory scheme which creates indefeasibility of title to land. 2. Let me take the first point. I begin with the concept of a binding precedent. In the hierarchy of a common law system of judicature, it is a general rule that the decisions of a higher court are binding on all courts below it. So, the decisions of an apex court are binding upon all courts below it. This practice of following the decisions of a higher court is often referred to as the doctrine of binding precedent or of stare decisis. Its object is to ensure certainty in the law. But then there are precedents and there are precedents. Some decisions of the highest court lay down a principle of common law that alters the position that obtained earlier. For example, until Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, the common law did not recognise that the manufacturer of a product owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumer. See, Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402. But the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson altered that position. Such a decision is, of course, binding because it established a new principle of law. This is an example of a true precedent. But where you have a case which involves the interpretation of a section in an Act of Parliament the doctrine of precedent has a lesser effect. See, Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204, per Lord Diplock. 3. Gummow J explained the difference between the interpretation of a statute and that of a judgment of a court in Brennan v Comcare (1994) 122 ALR 615 as follows:
4. It is important to recognise that the Federal Court in Adorna Properties was not laying down any new principle of the common law. It was merely interpreting a section in a statute. If it can therefore be demonstrated that Adorna Properties was decided per incuriam, no court in this country need follow it. As Sir John Salmond said in his Treatise on Jurisprudence (12th edn) at pages 151-2:
5. Before I comment on Adorna Properties let me I begin with section 340 of the Code. It has been set out in full by my learned brother in his judgment. For that reason I will merely refer to but not reproduce it. In its first sub-section it protects “the person for the time being registered as proprietor” of land against impeachment of his or her title. The phrase “for the time being” identifies the point of time at which indefeasibility of proprietorship is to be ascertained, namely, when action is filed to impeach the registered proprietor’s title. In general terms what section 340(1) amounts to is this. If your name appears on the register document of title then you are the owner of the land as against the whole world. As Abdul Malik Ishak J put it in Muthammah v Masri Mohamed [2000] 5 MLJ 518:
6. The other side of the same coin is this. Even if the registered proprietor acquired his title unlawfully, that is to say, in breach of written law, he may nevertheless assert it against the whole world until proceedings are brought to remove him from the register. And that is really the effect of section 340(1) of the Code. The decision of the former Federal Court in Teh Bee v Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 exemplifies the proposition. 7. In that case, the defendant was in occupation of certain land of which the plaintiff was the registered proprietor. He had been there for a very long time – since 1952. He occupied it by virtue of a temporary occupation licence which had been issued to him by the appropriate authority. The plaintiff had obtained registration of her title in breach of the express provisions of the Code which the State Authority had failed to observe. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in the magistrate’s court for vacant possession. In his defence, the defendant denied that the plaintiff was the registered proprietor of the land. He said that the State Authority had acted unlawfully in issuing the title to the plaintiff. He also said that the plaintiff’s title was invalid because it had been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and by unlawful means. He however did not file an action against the plaintiff and the State Authority claiming a declaration of invalidity and consequential orders. There was simply no frontal attack on the plaintiff’s title. This proved fatal. Because, what remained was only the issue whether the plaintiff’s name appeared on the register. It did. And on that ground she was entitled to succeed. As Ali Acting CJ (Malaya) said:
8. Let me re-emphasise that Maruthamuthu’s case was decided in the way it was because there was no attack on the plaintiff’s title. The defendant merely attempted to defend himself by relying on the unlawful way in which the plaintiff had acquired her title. That is insufficient. Absent direct and frontal attack upon the title of a registered proprietor section 340(1) insulates him completely. 9. I now turn to section 340(2). This carves out three circumstances in which the title of “the person for the time being registered as proprietor” “shall not be indefeasible”. In Kesarmal & Anor v Valliappa Chettiar [1954] MLJ 119, the Privy Council held that the latter phrase means “that the title of a proprietor is liable to be defeated.” A registered proprietor’s title is – to use the words of the Judicial Committee – “liable to be defeated” only in an action brought for that purpose. In other words, there cannot be a collateral attack upon a registered title. This reinforces the point I made earlier in this judgment. It follows that section 340(2) qualifies section 340(1) to afford a registered proprietor interim protection of his or her title. Put differently, the title of a registered proprietor remains indefeasible until it is successfully impeached in proceedings properly brought for that purpose by a person having locus standi to bring an action. Let me illustrate. V is the registered proprietor of Blackacre and holds the issue document of title. R, pretending to be V obtains a duplicate issue document to Blackacre. R then transfers Blackacre to P for valuable consideration. P is innocent. P would acquire a title to Blackacre that is indefeasible against the whole world except V or any person claiming through or under V. So, if P brings an action for ejectment against T, a trespasser on Blackacre, T cannot resist those proceedings by alleging that P’s title is defeasible because of the forgery. Neither will T succeed in an action to impeach P’s title because he lacks standing. However, P’s title remains defeasible as against V and V may bring an action to recover Blackacre from P. 10. But what if P transfers Blackacre to X? Can V recover his land from X? The answer to this question is provided by section 340(3). The subsection makes plain that the title remains defeasible in the hands of subsequent acquirers – X in the example given – or indeed anyone X may transfer Blackacre to. This is because it uses the expression “may subsequently be transferred”. But, as a matter of policy, a line must drawn beyond which the title to Blackacre must be put beyond the reach of V. And the Code in the proviso to section 340(3) draws that line at the door of a purchaser who acquires title from a registered proprietor in good faith and for valuable consideration. So in the example provided, if X acquired Blackacre from P or took a charge or lease of it from P in good faith and for valuable consideration, then X will obtain a title that is indefeasible even as against V. Since the proviso applies only to a subsequent purchaser it cannot and does not apply to P. 11. I now turn to Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Boonsom Boonyanit where the facts were these. The plaintiff, Boonsom was the owner of a valuable piece of land. The original title to her land was in her possession. A rogue, pretending to be the plaintiff, obtained a duplicate of the title. The plaintiff’s land was then sold and transferred to the defendant by means of forged documents. The plaintiff brought an action to recover her land. She had been the registered proprietor. She had been deprived of her proprietorship by a forgery. And the defendant had got itself onto the register by means of a forged instrument. Its title was therefore defeasible. Yet the plaintiff failed. Because the Federal Court read the proviso to sub-section (3) as qualifying subsection (2) by equating the expressions “registered proprietor” and “purchaser” both of which appear in section 340. 12. In my judgment, the decision in Adorna Properties is not to be treated as binding precedent because it was decided per incuriam. There are three reasons for this. First, it is plain as a pike staff that section 340(3) applies to subsequent acquirers of land, taking from a registered proprietor whose title is defeasible in the sense I have discussed earlier in this judgment. Adorna was not a subsequent purchaser. It took its title from the forger. The Federal Court therefore overlooked the critical words “to whom it may be subsequently be transferred” appearing in section 340(3). Second, the Federal Court in Adorna Properties when arriving at its decision overlooked at least two authorities which hold that the Code provides for deferred indefeasibility. In Mohammad bin Buyong v Pemungut Hasil Tanah Gombak & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 53, Hashim Yeop A Sani J (later CJ (Malaya)) said this:
Then there is the judgment of the Supreme Court, the immediate precursor of the Federal Court in M & J Frozen Food Sdn Bhd & Anor v Siland Sdn Bhd & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 294 In that case, Wan Yahya SCJ said:
Neither of these authorities were cited by the Federal Court in its judgment. Nor was any reason given why the judgment of Hashim Yeop A Sani J in Mohammad bin Buyong v Pemungut Hasil Tanah Gombak & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 53, which was quoted in the judgment of this Court was wrong and ought not to be followed. 13. Third, Adorna Properties, as I have already said, equated purchasers and registered proprietors. Here is the passage in which it did that:
In so doing, the Federal Court clearly overlooked the provisions of section 5 of the Code which defines them separately and differently as follows:
Accordingly, the decision in Adorna Properties, to use the words of Sir John Salmond in the passage already quoted, “was rendered in ignorance” of a statutory provision and as such cannot be treated as binding precedent. 14. There is a further point that needs to be made. The object and purpose of section 340 is to protect registered proprietors of land by affording them certainty of title. This is a just result because it is unfair and unjust that the true owner of land should be deprived of it by the machinations of a rogue. When a court interprets a statute, particularly one which confers rights upon or grants protection to persons generally or a class, its duty is to derive a meaning that is fair, or in accordance with the purpose of the particular Act of Parliament. Put differently, an interpretation should not be placed which will produce an unsatisfactory or unfair result. Indeed, there is a presumption that Parliament does not intend an unfair or unjust result. See, Pesuruhjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 30; ‘The Boucraa’ [1994] 1 All ER 20; Lim Phin Khian v Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 1. This is the approach that the Privy Council adopted in the very recent case of Bissonauth v The Sugar Fund Insurance Bond [2007] UKPC 17 (decided on 19 March 2007). In the Advice of the Board, delivered by Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, you will see several references to the criteria of fairness and justice when interpreting the statute that fell for consideration in that case. Now, as may be seen from what I have said thus far, Adorna Properties interpreted section 340 in a manner as to produce an unfair and unjust result. This is an added reason why Adorna Properties should not be followed. 15. It is no exaggeration to say that Adorna Properties has wreaked havoc in the law of real property. All you have to do is to read our national newspapers. You will find news stories of innocent landowners who have found themselves deprived of their land by forged instruments of dealing. There is no question that law as it stands today favours forgers. In Subramaniam v Sadrakasan [2005] 6 MLJ 120, I summed up the effect of Adorna Properties as follows:
16. I am therefore prepared to hold for the appellants for the reasons already advanced. However, even if Adorna Properties is binding (which I say it is not), then I turn to the second question: does it apply to the facts of the present instance to protect the first respondent? 17. It is central to the doctrine of indefeasibility housed in section 340 that the issue document of title must itself be genuine. In Adorna Properties, the instrument of transfer and other attendant documents were forged. But the title was genuine. In the present appeal I accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there is cogent evidence going to show that the issue document of title used to effect the transaction here was itself a forgery. Hence Adorna Properties is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. In my judgment the learned judge misdirected himself in not holding for the appellants on this ground. The appellant’s case must succeed because the vendors had no title to pass. You cannot give what you do not have – nemo dat quod non habet. And the only exception is in favour of a bona fide purchaser for value. See, M & J Frozen Food. As my learned brother Raus Sharif has demonstrated in his judgment, the evidence conclusively points against the respondent on this issue. The burden of proving that he is a bona fide purchaser lay on the respondent (Bhup Narain Singh v Gokhul Chand Mahton LR 61 IA 115) and he plainly failed to discharge it. JUDGMENT OF RAUS SHARIF JCA 1. This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court Johor Bahru which dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim against the 1st defendant with costs. The plaintiffs had in their statement of claim sought for the following reliefs:- (a) a declaration that they are the beneficial and legal owners of land held under Geran Mukim No. 312 Mukim Pulai, in the State of Johor (“the said land”); (b) a declaration that the transfer of the said land to the 1st defendant was void; (c) an order that the endorsement of the transfer on the issue document of title of the said land be cancelled and the Land Administrator, do effect the necessary cancellation; (d) general damages; and (e) interest and costs. 2. The plaintiffs, Au Meng Nam and Au Ming Kong, were previously the registered proprietors of the said land. On 17 September 1997, they came to know that the said land had been transferred to the 1st defendant, Ung Yak Chew vide the registration of the memorandum of transfer in Form 14A on 9 October 1996. 3. The plaintiffs contended that they had never entered into any agreement or signed any document to transfer of the said land to the 1st defendant. What happened was, two rogues claimed to be the proprietors of the said land entered into a sales and purchase agreement of the said land with the 1st defendant. This took place on 9 May 1996. 4. Hence, on 18 September 1997 the plaintiffs lodged a police report stating that the transfer of the said land to the 1st defendant was fraudulent. They subsequently brought this action against the 1st defendant. 5. The 1st defendant in his defence contended that he was a bona fide purchaser of the said land for valuable consideration within the proviso to s 340 (3) of the National Land Code 1965 (“Code”) and thus had obtained an indefeasible title to the said land. The 1st defendant, as a fall back position, filed a third party notice against Lau Kok Guan (“2nd defendant”) and Chuah Chong Ying (“3rd defendant”) for compensation or indemnity. He alleged that the 2nd and 3rd defendants were negligent. 6. The 2nd and 3rd defendants were at the material time, the partners of Messrs Lau Kok Guan & Partners, the firm of solicitors acting for the 1st defendant for the purchase and subsequent transfer of the said land. The 2nd and 3rd defendants denied of any negligence on their part. They too, as a fall back position, brought in the Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor Bahru (“the 4th defendant”) as the fourth party to this action, claiming for contribution or indemnity. They in turn alleged that the 4th defendant was negligent. 7. On 26 August 2005, the learned trial judge after a full trial, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim. He found it as a fact that the instrument of transfer of the said land to the 1st defendant was a forged document. Nevertheless, applying the Federal Court case of Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. v Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 1 MLJ 241 (“Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd.”) he held that the 1st defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value within the proviso to s 340 (3) of the Code and thus had acquired an indefeasible title to the said land. 8. One of the main issues raised by the plaintiffs in this
appeal was that the learned trial judge was wrong to rely on the case of
Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. Mr. Ng Chew Hor, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs submitted that Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. was decided per
incuriam and should not be followed. 10. During the trial, Adorna Properties argued that as an innocent third party purchaser for value, its title was indefeasible notwithstanding the forged signature on the memorandum of transfer and relied on s 340 of the Code. Section 340 reads as follows:-
11. The High Court in interpreting the above provisions held that even if the instrument of transfer was forged, Adorna Properties had nevertheless acquired indefeasible title over the property by virtue of s 340 (3) of the Code, which protects any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. (See Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 2 MLJ 863). Hence, the High Court ruled in favour of Adorna Properties. 12. The Court of Appeal interpreted the above provisions differently. (See Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. [1997] 2 MLJ 62). The Court of Appeal held that the words ‘any purchaser’ in s 340 (3) of the Code refers to a subsequent and not to an immediate purchaser. My learned brother, Gopal Sri Ram JCA speaking for the Court of Appeal held:-
13. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of Mrs. Boonsom Boonyanit. However the Federal Court overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal. Eusoff Chin CJ reasoned as follows:
14. Much criticism had been levelled against the Federal Court’s decision in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. To some, the Federal Court’s decision was plainly wrong and should be disregarded. (See Subramaniam Ns Dhurai v Sandrakasan Retnasamy & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 539). Associate Professor Teo Keang Sood of the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore in an article ‘Demise of Deferred Indefeasibility Under the Malaysia, Torrens System?” (Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2002, pg 403-408) writes:
15. The learned trial judge did not heed to the call of Professor Teo. I can understand the learned trial judge’s reluctance to depart from the Federal Court’s decision. I join his view. To depart would be to go against the doctrine of stare decisis. Speaking on the subject of doctrine of stare decisis Steve Shin CJ 16 (Sabah & Sarawak) in Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293 said:-
His Lordship further stated that:
16. Abdul Hamid Mohammad FCJ in the same case speaking on the same subject said:-
17. Taking the cue from the above observation of Abdul Hamid Mohammad FCJ, it is my respectful view that the Federal Court should review its decision in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. To me, by virtue of s 340 (2) (b) of the Code, the title of Adorna Properties was not indefeasible as the registration was obtained by forgery. Section 340 (3) does not apply to s 340 (2). The proviso states “Provided that in this sub-section” and this sub-section refers to s 340 (3) and not s 340 (2). Section 340 (3) (a) refers to “to whom it may subsequently be transferred” which means that the intended purchaser is the subsequent purchaser and not the immediate purchaser. 18. Similarly, in the instant case, the title of the 1st defendant is
defeasible as the registration was obtained by forgery. The 1st
respondent was the immediate purchaser and not a subsequent
purchaser. Section 340 (3) has no application as it refers to
subsequent purchaser and not the immediate purchaser. Thus,
the plaintiffs would have succeeded in this appeal if not for the
Federal Court interpretation of s 340 of the Code in Adorna
Properties Sdn. Bhd. But for the reasons given earlier, I am
not ready to ignore or disregard the Federal Court’s decision in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. 20. With utmost respect and having read and re-read the judgment
under appeal, I do not think that the findings of the learned trial
judge turns solely on the question of fact. The learned trial
judge in concluding that the 1st defendant was a bona fide
purchaser said:-
21. It is clear from the above that the findings of the learned trial judge do not solely turns on a question of fact. It was a mixed question of fact and law. Thus, the proposition by Mr. Wong Kim Fatt was not entirely correct. I am also of the view that even if the findings of the learned trial judge was based on factual ground it does not absolve this Court of doing its duty as an appellate court. Lindley MR in Coghlan v Cumberland [1898] 1 Ch 704 summed up that duty as follows:-
22. In fact, this Court in Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97, formulated the following test warranting appellate intervention:
23. On appeal, the Federal Court affirmed the approach taken by this Court. (See Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1. Steve Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) who delivered the judgment of the Court said:
24. With the above in mind, I will now examine learned trial judge’s reasoning in holding that the 1st defendant was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. One of the reasons given was that the sale and purchase agreement speaks for itself. To the learned trial judge, the 1st defendant was a bona fide purchaser and had given valuable consideration because of the existence of the sale and purchase agreement and the purchase price had been paid in full. With respect such reasoning is seriously flawed. An existence of a sale and purchase agreement and the payment of the purchase price in full cannot be the only indicator to show whether a person is a bona fide purchaser or otherwise. Other salient features surrounding the sale and purchase agreement must be considered. In the present case, the learned trial judge failed to take into account the followings:
25. Had the learned trial judge taken the above facts and circumstances into consideration, he cannot possibly conclude that the 1st defendant was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, so as to be protected under s 340 (3) of the Code. To me, the 1st defendant had acted hastily. He concluded the sale without any proper investigation into the title or the persons claiming to be proprietors. No doubt he had every right to take advantage of the low price that was offered to him but he took the risk. When he embarked into such risk, it cannot be at the expense of the plaintiffs. This is because while he had a choice, the plaintiffs had none. In fact, the plaintiffs were helpless. The plaintiffs could not do anything to prevent the fraud. Even locking the title in a safe would not had help the plaintiffs. In such circumstances the court must not favour the 1st defendant, over the plaintiffs. To do so, would be doing injustice to the plaintiffs. 26. Further, had the evidence adduced in this case been properly considered and assessed by the learned trial judge, a reasonable inference would be that the 1st defendant knew at the time he bought the said land, the purchase price was below the market value. But he wanted to take advantage of the low price. He did a fast track to complete the purchase. In doing so he disregarded his obligations to investigate the alleged proprietors and the genuineness of the documents. My respectful view is that a purchaser in good faith does not include a purchaser who is careless or who had been negligent. In Oliver v Hinton [1899] Chancery Division 264 Lindley M.R. said:
27. So too here. The 1st defendant is under the obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of the said land and not to just blindly accept what was claimed by the ‘vendors’ as correct and genuine. When he failed to take the ordinary precautions which ought to be taken in such a matter he is not entitled to the protection of the court. 28. Another error on the part of the learned trial judge is this. While he acknowledged the fact that the consideration paid by the 1st defendant was below the government valuation and the plaintiffs’ valuer but concluded that “that by itself cannot negative the 1st defendant’s status as bona fide purchase for valuable consideration bearing in mind that the plaintiffs have failed to adduce evidence of the 1st defendant to the fraud or forgery”. Clearly, the learned trial judge had misdirected himself on the law. To me, since the 1st defendant was relying on the proviso of s 340 (3) of the Code, that he was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, the evidential burden falls on him. The evidential burden remained with the 1st defendant. There is no duty on the plaintiffs to prove that the 1st defendant was a party or privy to the fraud or forgery. 29. For the above reasons, I would allow the plaintiffs’ appeal and set aside the order of the High Court in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim against the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to the declaration that they are the beneficial and legal owners of the said land. There shall also be a consequential order that the endorsement of the transfer vide presentation No. 1299/96 be cancelled and the issue document of title be rectified by the 4th defendant. The plaintiffs are entitled to damages to be assessed by the Registrar of the High Court. They are also entitled to costs of this appeal as well as in the court below. The deposit paid into court shall be refunded to the plaintiffs. 30. The next issue in this appeal is whether the 1st defendant could attach any liability against the 2nd and 3rd defendants. My respectful view is that, no liability could be attached against the 2nd and 3rd defendants. The 1st defendant had adduced no evidence at the trial to support the allegation that the 2nd and 3rd defendants were negligent. Moreover from the circumstances of the transaction it clearly indicate that the 1st defendant took a commercial decision to purchase the land which he admitted was a good bargain. In a single day, he visited the land, decided to purchase it and agreed to the term of the sale including an initial payment of 80% of the purchase price in cash. These were done before the 1st defendant consulted the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant in his evidence stated that when the 1st defendant came to see him, he informed him (1st defendant) of the risk. But according to the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant who was a regular client and was familiar with sales and purchase of real property, wanted to proceed with the transaction and urgently too. The 2nd defendant further testified that instructions were given to him to prepare the terms as have already be agreed upon. Certainly, under such circumstances the 2nd and 3rd defendants cannot be blamed. Accordingly the 1st defendant’s claim against the 2nd and 3rd defendants is dismissed with costs here and the court below. 31. Since no liability could be attached against the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the 2nd and 3rd defendants claim for contribution or indemnity against the 4th defendant should also be dismissed. In fact no evidence was adduced in these proceedings that the 4th defendant had acted mala fide or had committed fraud or forgery or had conspired with anybody. The 4th defendant as the Land Administrator was merely performing his statutory function and duties in the registration of the transfer of the said law. Accordingly the 2nd and 3rd defendants claim against 4th defendant is dismissed with costs here and the court below. JUDGMENT OF HASAN BIN LAH JCA I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother Raus Sharif JCA in draft and I am in entire agreement with it. I have nothing more to add. Dated this 12th day of July 2007. Counsel for the appelllants: Ng Chew Hor Counsel for the 1st respondent: Wong Kim Fatt (J.Jayaperakash and Wong
Boon Lee with with him) Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents: George Neo (Y.H. Ngu
with him) Counsel for the 4th respondent: Abdul Rashid bin Sudin |
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