This is a country paper aimed at providing a brief overview of the impact of terrorism and anti–terrorism measures in Malaysia.
I Country analysis
Human rights
Malaysia is a member of the United Nations and has ratified the Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
In principle, Malaysia has consistently affirmed to the world its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 ('UDHR'). This was evidenced again through the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.
In practice, however, the rights guaranteed under the UDHR are not enforceable in the courts. Similarly, the utility of the UDHR as an aid to the interpretation or to the enlargement of rights and fundamental liberties set out in the Malaysian Constitution have not been accepted. The Government continually takes the position that the UDHR is not a legally binding instrument but merely a statement of principles devoid of any obligatory character. It is therefore not part of our municipal law. This argument has been accepted by the courts.
Malaysia has not ratified the other principal human rights instruments – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976 ('ICCPR') and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1976 ('ICESCR'). It is not expected that Malaysia will do so in the near future as the political approach to these instruments by the Government is one of resistance.
Malaysia acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990 ('CRC') on March 19, 1995 and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1981 on August 4, 1995. Reservations to certain fundamental clauses have been lodged. There has as yet been no reported legal jurisprudence on the applicability and value of these conventions in terms of enforcement in Malaysia.
By the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act, 1999, Malaysia established the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia ('SUHAKAM'). Its functions shall be, among others, to promote awareness of and provide education in relation to human rights, to advise and make recommendations on human rights issues to the Government and to inquire into complaints of human rights infringements. It has no enforcement powers.
The context and political environment in which SUHAKAM was formed must be understood. The Malaysian deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, was sacked in late–1998 giving birth to the Reformasi movement. During his detention, he was assaulted by the nation's high ranking police officer, the Inspector–General of Police, sparking outrage locally and around the world. Mass processions and assemblies in support of Anwar were held and ruthlessly quelled by the authorities. International condemnation mounted to pressure the Government to stop the rapid deterioration in human rights and to halt the continued abuses against the people. The Government saw the need to improve its image internationally and deflect such criticisms. It then moved the establishment of SUHAKAM hoping that this would appease the international community .
Since its inception, SUHAKAM has actively carried out its mandate culminating in no less than 15 reports. All of its annual reports have been submitted to Parliament but have neither been tabled nor debated. The Government appears to be reluctant to discuss the matters contained in the reports. No formal reason has been given why time has not been allocated for these reports.
II Pre–9/11 existing measures
Criminal law
Terrorism is a generic term which encapsulates the method of causing harm based on certain motivations or ideologies fuelling such actions. In other words, the use or threat of use of force is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. It is generally thought that any such methods would be dealt with as a general criminal offence, such as assault to the person, possession of firearms or complicity to murder.
Save for one exception, there were no specific penal law provisions dealing with terrorism or terrorism–related offences pre–9/11. The exception was the offences under Chapter VI 'Offences Against the State' in sections 121 – 130A of the Penal Code. In a nutshell, the offences cover the act of waging war against the Yang di–Pertuan Agong (ie, the King as the constitutional head of the Government of Malaysia). It is generally thought that terrorism offences fall under this category as terrorism is waging war against the State and, at times, considered treason.
The elements to be proved for the offence of waging war are as follows:
1. the purpose or intention of the accused is to stage an insurrection or to directly challenge the Government's authority;
2. the insurrection or the challenge to the Government's authority is by the use of force and violence; and,
3. the purpose of such an insurrection or challenge to the Government's authority is to accomplish an object of a general public nature.
This offence was successfully proved in the recent prosecution of the Al–Ma'unah group for the Grik incident where the accused persons were convicted of contriving to obtain possession of an arsenal of weapons and, when called upon to surrender it, used the rifles and ammunitions so obtained against Government troops. It was found that the purpose of their struggle was to overthrow the Government by the force of arms and to restrain the King from reigning according to law. It was also found that they were guided by the purported 'jihad' cause which was to strive to set up an Islamic State based on the Holy Quran. The trial judge found that the Grik incident was an offence which amounted to an act of terrorism.
These provisions have not been repealed and are still valid law. There has been no other case after the Grik incident where these provisions have been invoked.
Preventive detention laws
Malaysia has enacted a wide range of preventive detention laws which allow the Government to detain persons without ever bringing them to trial. One of these laws is the Internal Security Act, 1960 ('ISA'). The main provisions with regards to preventive detention are sections 73 and 8 of the ISA.
Section 73 of the ISA allows the police to detain any person for up to 60 days without bringing them before the courts. Thereafter, the detainee may be, and under normal circumstances usually are, detained under section 8 by the Home Minister for a period not exceeding 2 years. This detention period may be, and often is, renewed any number of times, for a period not exceeding 2 years at any one time. There is no fetter to the renewals.
Further section 8B of the ISA bars judicial review in any form, be it a writ of habeas corpus to free the detainee or any other application, suit or legal action challenging the Minister's order made under section 8, save for procedural requirements. The courts are precluded from examining and looking into the substance of the Minister's order, i.e. whether there were sufficient admissible facts which merited the order, whether there were grounds to substantiate the order and that the order was not made in bad faith.
A challenge on procedural grounds is practically ineffectual as it has been common practice that upon release of the detainee by the courts on procedural grounds, the Government would then re–arrest the detainee under a fresh section 8 order.
Since late August 2001, the Government used the ISA to detain people they termed 'terror suspects'. As at August 2004, 75 detainees were purported Jemaah Islamiah ('JI') members and 12 detainees were purported Kumpulan Militan Malaysia ('KMM') members. To date, numerous detentions have been extended further after the expiry of the initial 2 year detention period. Those who appear to have 'repented' or 'rehabilitated' have been conditionally released. They are placed under restricted residence orders. 10 KMM detainees were conditionally released, at different times, in 2004.
To date, no criminal prosecution has been brought against any person for terrorist activities or terrorism–related offences. The terror suspects detained under the ISA have not been formally charged in an open court nor afforded a trial. They still hold the moral high ground vis–Ã –vis the Government in respect of their detention.
III Post–9/11 new measures
Criminal law – Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code
Malaysia has recently amended the Penal Code by enacting new terrorism and terrorism–related offences. The following definitions of a 'terrorist' and 'terrorist act' have been brought in to classify the offences and are as follows:
'terrorist' means any person who––
(a) commits, or attempts to commit any terrorist act; or
(b) participates in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist act, ...
(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, 'terrorist act' means an act or threat of action within or beyond Malaysia that––
(a) involves serious bodily injury to a person;
(b) involves serious damage to property;
(c) endangers a person's life;
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or the safety of the public or a section of the public;
(e) involves the use of firearms, explosives or other lethal devices;
(f) involves releasing into the environment or any part of the environment or distributing or exposing the public or any part of the public to––
(i) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance;
(ii) any toxic chemical; or
(iii) any microbial or other biological agent or toxin;
(g) is designed or intended to disrupt or seriously interfere with, any computer system or the provision of any services' directly related to communications infrastructure, banking or financial services, utilities, transportation or other essential infrastructure;
(h) is designed or intended to disrupt, or seriously interfere with, the provision of essential emergency services such as police, civil defence or medical services;
(i) involves prejudice to national security or public safety; or
(j) involves any combination of any of the acts specified in paragraphs (a) to (i),
where the act or threat is intended or may reasonably be regarded as being intended to––
(aa) intimidate the public or a section of the public; or
(bb) influence or compel the Government of Malaysia or the Government of any State in Malaysia, any other government, or any international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
and includes any act or omission constituting an offence under the Aviation Offences Act 1984 [Act 307].
The main complaint of civil society groups has been that the definitions are too broad. They elevate simple offences to crimes of terrorism based solely on the intent of committing such offences – to intimidate the public or to influence the Government or any international organization from doing or refraining from doing any act. The yardstick to gauge that intent – where the act or threat is intended or may reasonably be regarded as being intended to – is ambiguous and vague.
The broad definitions couched in generous terms may lead to a clampdown of legitimate political dissent in the name of terrorism. It is easy to see how vigorous public protests and demonstrations, non–violent and peaceful civil disobedience, trade union strikes, political activists and organizations who use direct action such as election campaigning to further their agendas would be vulnerable to prosecution under the new law.
There is also a new provision in the Penal Code which makes it an offence for anyone to directly or indirectly provide or make available financial or legal services or facilities for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of a terrorist act or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is committing or facilitating the commission of a terrorist act or knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that, in whole or in part, the services or facilities will be used by or will benefit any terrorist, terrorist entity or terrorist group. The penalty, if the terrorist act results in death, is death. In any other case, it is punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than 7 years but not exceeding 30 years and a fine.
By its definition, this new section affects lawyers and accountants. However, the structure of the offence is loose and imprecise. When does the knowledge of benefiting any person to commit or facilitate a terrorist act come into play – at the time the lawyer or accountant was retained or at some subsequent time? Does the offence now make it obligatory for lawyers search out and uncover, at the outset, whether there are any reasonable grounds for believing that the services provided will end up benefiting a terrorist?
Do lawyers who defend suspected terrorists, in or out of court, fall within the offence? It must be noted that there is no legislated 'escape clause' for lawyers defending their clients in court from being exempt from the offence. Does it mean that suspected terrorists ought not be defended in court? If suspected terrorists are found guilty of acts of terrorism, does it mean, if they were defended, that their legal counsels are liable for an offence under this section?
Lawyers have a duty to uphold justice without fear or favour and without regard to their own interests. This new offence erodes this jurisprudence and in particular, lawyer–client professional privilege.
In line with the advent of the new anti–terrorism law in the Penal Code, the police and the Public Prosecutor are also given a wide array of investigatory powers including the power to intercept communications. These take effect under the recent amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code. These powers may be invoked on a low standard of proof and without sufficient human rights content–based safeguards. Based on these unchecked definitions, investigations into alleged terrorist activities, defined broadly would be carte blanche for civil liberty infringements.
Criminal law – Anti Money Laundering Act, 2001
Malaysia has enacted the Anti Money Laundering Act, 2001 ('AMLA') which came into force on January 15, 2002. The AMLA makes money laundering an offence and defines the offence broadly. A guilty intention to commit such offence may be imputed if it can be inferred from objective factual circumstances that the person knew, or had reason to believe, that the property in question are proceeds from any unlawful activity or the person, without reasonable excuse, fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether or not the property in question was the proceeds from any unlawful activity.
It further requires certain institutions to report transactions that exceed a certain limit where they have reason to believe the transaction involves the proceeds of an 'unlawful activity'. An 'unlawful activity' is defined broadly as an activity related directly or indirectly to a serious offence or a foreign serious offence. The said offences are listed in the schedule to the Act and includes the attempt or abetment of such offences. The schedule contains more than 100 serious offences under various legislations. Terrorism–related offences such as sections 121, 121A, 121B, 121C, 125 and 125A of the Penal Code are included.
A lawyer is now considered a 'reporting institution' and it is mandatory for lawyers to promptly report any suspicious transaction encountered in the course of preparing for, or carrying out, transactions involving the following range of activities:
1. the buying and selling of immovable property;
2. the managing of clients' money, securities and other property;
3. the managing of accounts, including savings and securities accounts;
4. organizing contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies;
5. the creation, operation or management of legal entities or the arrangement for and buying and selling of business entities.
Failure to report a suspicious transaction is an offence which carries a maximum fine of RM250,000.00.
The AMLA is regressive and draconian because it dilutes, and in certain matters removes, fundamental human rights precepts. It undermines constitutional guarantees and the principles of a fair trial, thereby increasing the risk of unsafe convictions, as follows:
1. The right to silence
1.1 There is no longer the right to remain silent when investigated or examined by the authorities. Every person is legally bound to answer all questions. All answers shall be admissible as evidence in any proceeding notwithstanding any written law or rule of law to the contrary.
1.2 The failure of any person arrested to state any fact on which he intends to rely on his defence at his trial may result in inferences drawn which may then be treated as corroboration of any evidence against him. This amounts to the drawing of adverse inferences from the silence of the accused.
2. The burden of proof
2.1 On a question of fact pertaining to all matters such as the seizure or forfeiture of property but save for a criminal prosecution under the AMLA, the courts shall decide the question on the civil balance of probabilities standard, and not on the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
2.2 This is a dilution of the burden of proof in matters involving a penal sanction.
3. Legal professional privilege
3.1 It is mandatory to report suspicious transactions. Legal professional privilege between counsel and client is not a defence. The courts may compel the disclosure of certain privileged information.
3.2 The saving provision in the AMLA that information 'for the purposes of any pending proceedings' is privileged is not sufficiently defined. It is unclear as to when and to what extent the provision may be invoked. Would any undisposed transaction between the client and a lawyer be a pending proceeding?
4. Secrecy
4.1 Reporting institutions and in particular, lawyers, are now under the onerous duty to scrutinize and examine, with a fine–tooth comb, the transactions they undertake on behalf of their clients. They would need to make further enquiries than were previously necessary. This will in the long–term ultimately lead to a climate of mutual distrust between lawyers and their clients.
4.2 Lawyers will have to make commercial and moral decisions as to whether or not to report a transaction. The uncertainty as to whether the transaction is a suspicious transaction may lead to over–reporting or under–reporting. Either way, the costs of providing legal services will rise and continue to be a burden to the ordinary layperson.
The amendments to include anti–terrorism financing provisions into the AMLA (such as to extend the power to freeze, seize and forfeit the property of persons deemed terrorists or terrorist groups and other ancillary powers to dispose of property used in the commission of terrorism financing offences) are not in force yet, but the provisions operate on similar lines as those highlighted above. The same complaint about the broad definitions of who is a terrorist and what is a terrorist act, as discussed above, are relevant here.
To date, there has been only one prosecution for money laundering under the AMLA but it appears that it was not terrorism–related laundering. The prosecution is still pending in court .
IV Specific legal case studies
The Government has taken the approach of detaining terror suspects in Malaysia under the ISA, and of not prosecuting them. As part of the campaign strategy against the ISA in Malaysia, civil society groups such as Suara Rakyat Malaysia ('SUARAM') and the Abolish ISA Movement ('AIM') have mobilized grassroot and family support to lead legal test cases to challenge these detentions.
Some of the cases are as follows :
1. Nasharuddin bin Nasir v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2002] 6 MLJ 65
Nasharuddin was detained for being a purported JI member. He filed an application for habeas corpus which was allowed by the High Court on the main point that the grounds to detain him were not properly considered. Before he was physically released to his family, he was served with a fresh detention order under section 8 and re–arrested. He is still serving his detention. The Federal Court subsequently overturned the High Court decision on the purely technical ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order in view of section 8B which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts save as to procedural matters.
2. Sejahratul Dursina @ Chomel binti Mohamad v Kerajaan Malaysia [2004] 4 AMR 66
Chomel is the wife of Yazid Sufaat, himself an ISA detainee and purportedly a JI member. She was detained by the police under section 73 and was the first woman detained under the ISA on terror charges. Her application for habeas corpus was filed and heard. Just hours before the High Court was to deliver the decision, Chomel was released on a restricted residence order under the ISA. Arguably, this was to render her habeas corpus application academic. The High Court was requested to still deliver its decision. The court dismissed the application and her appeal is pending in the Federal Court.
3. Ahmad Yani bin Ismail & Anor v Ketua Polis Negara & 2 ors [2004] 5 AMR 571
Both applicants were detained for being purported JI members. Their applications for habeas corpus were filed and challenged on substantive constitutional grounds. The main argument was that the grounds of detention did not state and do not show any future threat to the security of Malaysia, an element which was required under the ISA. It was hoped that, should this argument prevail, it would apply to all terror suspects held under the ISA. This argument was rejected. Their appeals are pending in the Federal Court.
4. Abdul Razak bin Baharudin & 7 Ors v Ketua Polis Negara & 2 Ors [High Court Application No. 44–66–2003]
8 ISA detainees filed their applications for habeas corpus. They were detained for being purported JI members. Aside from the arguments taken in Ahmad Yani, the other main argument put forth was the fact that the grounds for detention by the Home Minister were only made after the detention orders were signed. It was argued this clearly showed that the Home Minister did not apply his mind properly before signing the detention orders because the detention orders had to be made on the basis of the grounds for detention, and not before the said grounds existed. The High Court dismissed the applications and their appeals are pending in the Federal Court .
5. Muhammad Radzi bin Abdul Razak v Ketua Polis Negara & 2 Ors [High Court Application No. 44–102–2003] and Mohd Akil Bin Abdul Raof v Ketua Polis Negara & 2 Ors [High Court Application No. 44–103–2003]
On September 20, 2003, 13 students from Malaysia studying in Karachi, Pakistan were detained for alleged links with JI and for training at Al–Qaeda ('AQ') camps. They were then interrogated by authorities from Pakistan and the USA. They were deported to Malaysia and, immediately on arrival, on November 10, 2003, they were detained by the police pursuant to section 73.
On December 5, 2003, 2 of the students namely Muhammad Radzi Bin Abdul Razak and Mohd Akil Bin Abdul Raof filed their habeas corpus applications seeking their release from police detention. In their affidavits, both students strenuously denied any involvement with JI and AQ and challenged the police and Government to adduce evidence in open court to substantiate their allegations. The hearing of the applications were fixed for December 11, 2003.
On December 8, 2003, 3 days before the hearing, the Home Minister issued detention orders pursuant to section 8 against Muhammad Radzi Bin Abdul Razak, Mohd Akil Bin Abdul Raof and 3 other students directing that they be held for 2 years from December 9, 2003 at the Taiping Detention Centre, Kamunting.
As a result of the Home Minister's orders, the habeas corpus applications had been overtaken by events and been rendered academic. The hearing of the applications could not proceed and on December 11, 2003, the applications were withdrawn. Arguably, the issuance of the section 8 orders was a step taken to subvert the applications and to avoid judicial scrutiny of the police detentions.
The 5 students have to date not been sent to Taiping Detention Centre, Kamunting and the whereabouts of their detention are unknown.
6. Nik Adli bin Nik Abdul Aziz & 12 Ors v Ketua Polis Negara & 3 Ors [High Court Application No. 44–41–2004]
The 13 applicants were purported to be KMM members. Their detentions were extended after the initial detention period of 2 years lapsed. The main grounds for their challenge was that the Home Minister mechanically extended their detentions without properly considering the facts and allegations based on the evidence presented by the Government before the High Court. The High Court dismissed their applications on September 1, 2004 and their appeals are pending before the Federal Court.
7. Mohamad Iqbal bin A Rahman v Ketua Pengarah Imigresen & Anor [High Court Application No. 44–90–2003]
Iqbal was a popular Indonesian Islamic preacher who had permanent resident status in Malaysia. He was detained under section 8 for 2 years from August 22, 2001 for being a purported JI member. He was due to be released on August 22, 2003. On August 18, 2003, he was declared a prohibited immigrant and an undesirable person by the Immigration Department and Government of Malaysia. Based on this, he was ordered to be deported from Malaysia back to Indonesia. Pending the deportation, he was detained by the Immigration authorities.
On February 9, 2004, he filed a habeas corpus application for his release. The application was heard on May 7, 2004 after several postponements. Iqbal's lawyers commenced arguments showing how and why the declaration made was wrong in law; and further, that the deportation order and detention of Iqbal were not valid.
The Government requested a postponement for a new hearing date in order to mount a reply. Further hearing was fixed on May 14, 2004 at 2.45pm.
On the morning of May 14, 2004, just hours before the scheduled hearing, Iqbal was deported. He was not served any fresh deportation order. This was done without the knowledge of Iqbal's lawyers. When the case was called at 2.45pm, the Government informed the High Court that Iqbal had been deported that morning and therefore the application was academic. When asked by the court as to the Government's position with regards to the declaration and deportation order, the Government conceded that the same were defective and invalid.
The High Court proceeded to rule that the detention of Iqbal had been unlawful but, because Iqbal had already been deported, the application was academic.
8. Mohamad Iqbal bin A Rahman & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Imigresen & 2 Ors [High Court Judicial Review Application No. R2–25–179–2003]
Iqbal directly challenged the declaration made that he was a prohibited immigrant and an undesirable person. The High Court granted leave to proceed with the substantive application for judicial review and directed written submissions to be filed.
Iqbal's lawyers filed their written submissions but the Government did not. Instead, and after Iqbal was deported on May 14, 2004, the Government requested an appointment with the court. The Government asked that the case be dismissed as there was no longer any live issue before the court in view of Iqbal's deportation. Any judgment in the case was academic. Iqbal's lawyers maintained that the case was not academic and any judgment of the court would be relevant and applicable. This was strenuously argued by way of oral and written submissions.
The High Court accepted the Government's submissions and dismissed the case with no order as to costs. Iqbal's appeal is pending in the Court of Appeal.
V Advocacy campaign
The advocacy campaign in Malaysia is equally important. AIM has engaged with the Government, SUHAKAM and the people on issues relating to the ISA including, among others:
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Mobilizing, educating and empowering family members of ISA detainees to articulate their issues and fight their causes both through the courts and extra–judicially.
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Providing humanitarian support to the families of ISA detainees.
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Leading delegations to SUHAKAM to raise issues and lodge complaints of abuses by the police and Government under the ISA.
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Leading a delegation to the Special Commission to Enhance the Operations and Management of the Royal Malaysia Police Force to present a memorandum on the torture of ISA detainees by the police during the section 73 detentions.
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Leading delegations to the Internal Security Ministry to engage the Government on ISA–related issues and the detainees.
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Strategizing and working with the media to publicize and release ISA–related news and stories, as well as to highlight the plight of the ISA detainees and their families.
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Educating the public and creating awareness of issues relating to the ISA by organizing public events and programmes.
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Networking and linking with international organizations and lobby groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists and the United Nations to raise awareness of ISA–related issues worldwide and to lobby international pressure on the Government.
AIM's persistent campaigning and strategies has been met with some achievements such as the release of numerous ISA detainees and in increased public awareness and articulation of ISA–related issues. The result of AIM's constant pressure is also borne out in SUHAKAM's recommendation in its comprehensive report that the ISA should be repealed on the basis that it violates fundamental human rights.
VI Impact on civil society
The new anti–terrorism measures introduce further layers to an already repressive regime in Malaysia without concomitant civil and political rights protections ascribed to the people of Malaysia as set forth in the International Bill of Rights. The climate of fear that has prevailed in Malaysia by the existence and the use of laws such as the ISA continue to dominate the minds and grip the lives of the people. The emphasis on terrorism and national security as one of the focal points of the Government's recent election campaign through the media, which it controls, perpetuates this culture of fear among the people. It was said that a vote for the Government is a vote for security. Within this environment, the ruling coalition is returned to power with ease. This was evident in the last general elections where it won by an overwhelming 90% majority in Parliament.
The Government then represents that its policies and laws such as the ISA is a blueprint for the world. It is able to quell public opinion on a wide–range of issues by a combination of media control, institutionalized culture of fear and the apparent legitimacy given it by the people. New anti–terrorism measures are not challenged by the people but accepted, quite wrongly, in the name of national security. The desire to have security is manipulated by the Government to give a false sense of security. The scope of public debate is further restricted by the lack of true democratic space and of a flow of critical information.
It has been evaluated that human rights has now been 'pushed to the brink' and any advancement or gains over the many years have been reversed. This is true especially on the issue of counter–terrorism measures. The challenge today for human rights advocates is to move away from traditional methods of advocacy and to articulate our causes from a different perspective. It does not mean we compromise our positions or principles. It means we can no longer act or react as we have so comfortably done in the past.
The first step is to view anti–terrorism measures not as a complete affront to human rights norms but rather as part of the human rights agenda of protection. The emphasis of human rights protection has merely shifted. Once we accept that there may be new measures which have to be put in place to enhance the protection of the rights of potential victims of terrorist activities, we will be able to articulate human rights safeguards in a more effective way with counter–terrorism agencies and governments. A failure to recognize this is a failure to advance the human rights story progressively.
Once we accept this, the question left to be answered is how human rights advocates are able to successfully ensure rights–based safeguards are supplanted to check and balance counter–terrorism measures. Both safeguards and laws are now part of the human rights agenda of providing protection mechanisms rather than being pitched in conflict with each other.
When this view is taken as a starting point, it is anticipated that engagement with counter–terrorism agencies and governments will be taken to a higher level and our advocacy would result in more meaningful results.
Published in Infoline October/November/December 2004