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Contributed by Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi

Evolution: The process of conversion from Malaya to Malaysia was by no means trouble free. In favour of reconstituting Malaya were the Resolution of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (1961), the Resolution of the Legislative Council of North Borneo (1962), the Report of the British-Malayan Cobbold Commission (1962) and the Twenty-Points Manifesto of the Sabah Alliance (1962).

In addition, the General Elections held in North Borneo in 1962 and in Sarawak in 1963, pointed to the desire of the people of the Borneo States to join Malaysia on the condition that their special interests were safeguarded in the new federation.

The Governments of the Philippines and Indonesia were, however, vehemently opposed to Malaya’s reconstitution. They rejected the legitimacy of the above self determination processes. A Tripartite Summit was, therefore, held in Manila which invited the UN Secretary-General to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak.

The Secretary-General’s mission spent three weeks in Borneo to conduct a survey and released its finding on 15 September 1963 that the Malaysia proposal had the wide backing of the peoples of Borneo States.

Still, the Indonesian and Philippines governments were not appeased. Indonesia resorted to an undeclared war dubbed “the confrontation”. The Philippines laid an international law claim to Sabah.

Within the country the State of Kelantan commenced proceedings in the High Court to declare the Malaysia Agreement null and void. A few days before Malaysia Day it laid two arguments before the court.

First, it argued that it was a founding member of the Federation of Malaya and as such its consent must be obtained before any changes are made that alter drastically the character of the Federation. It complained that bringing Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into the Federation would reduce the majority Malays into a minority in their own country.

The court rejected this argument. Kelantan had agreed to the1957 Constitution and in that basic charter, the power to amend the Constitution to bring new States into the Federation was a federal power that did not require the consent of the States.

Kelantan’s second contention was that there was a binding constitutional custom that any major amendment requires the consent of the States. The Court ruled that customs are not laws and are not enforceable in the courts. History may prove Kelantan right but the courts cannot allow a custom to block the legal process.

As we all know history did prove Kelantan right within a very short time in relation to Singapore. But Malaysia went on to become a legal and political reality.

Basis for special treatment: In 1963 the Inter-Governmental Committee headed by Lord Lansdowne with Tun Razak as the Deputy Chairman worked out several constitutional arrangements to guarantee the special position of the Borneo States. This was deemed justifiable due to a number of socio-political, economic, geographical and legal factors.

More autonomy: Malaysia’s federal model provides for a heavy central bias. But in relation to Sabah and Sarawak the federal government’s powers are not so pronounced. For example, Sabah and Sarawak are excluded from Parliament’s power to pass uniform laws about land and local government: Article 95D. Sabah and Sarawak are also excluded from national plans for land utilization, local government and development: Article 95E.

There are special rules about audits in Sabah and Sarawak (Article 112A).

The power of amending the Constitution which belongs to the federal Parliament is not as extensive in relation to Sabah and Sarawak as it is in relation to the peninsular States. Under Article 161E constitutional amendments affecting the specified rights of the East Malaysian States cannot become law without the consent of the Governors of these States.

The legislative competence of the various States is elaborated in the Federal Constitution’s Schedule 9 Lists II and III. Sabah and Sarawak have a Supplementary State List and a Supplementary Concurrent List conferring on them many legislative powers not allocated to the peninsular States.

Financial powers: Money represents power. The Federal government’s stranglehold over most of the lucrative sources of revenue is not as strong in relation to Sabah and Sarawak as it is in relation to other States. This is partly due to the special needs of these states and partly due to the size and potential resources of these regions.

In three areas Sabah and Sarawak enjoy fiscal privileges that are not available to the peninsular States:

Other privileges: The Federal Constitution is replete with many other provisions for the special position of Sabah and Sarawak.

Forty-six years down the road, not all is well with Sabah-Sarawak’s relationship with the Centre. The influx of illegal immigrants and the alleged “naturalization” of thousands of them are being regarded as a violation of Sabah and Sarawak’s rights over immigration. There are murmurs of discontent about the BN’s choice of MBs and Governors. Labuan’s federalization is a sore point.

In the Peninsula, there are concerns that integration is being hindered because of restrictions on freedom of movement and the requirement of work permits in one’s own land. These are legitimate concerns. But one must also remember that in 1963 some concessions were awarded. They must be honoured. Unity and integration, while laudable goals, must not be forced. They must be achieved within and not outside the solemn pact of 1963.

Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi is Emeritus Professor at UiTM and Visiting Professor at USM.

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